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Sustaining Collective Self-Governance and Collective Action:
A Constitutional Role Morality for Presidents and Members of Congress
Neil S. Siegel*
ABSTRACT
In the United States today, the behavior of the political branches is generally viewed as
more damaging to the American constitutional system than is the behavior of the federal courts.
Yet constitutional law scholarship continues to focus primarily on judges and judging. This
Article suggests that such scholarship should develop for presidents and members of Congress
what it has long advocated for judges: a role morality that imposes normative limits on the
exercise of official discretion over and above strictly legal limits. The Article first grounds a role
morality for federal elected officials in two purposes of the U.S. Constitution whose vindication
requires more than compliance with legal rules: securing the American conception of democracy
as collective self-governance and creating a reasonably well-functioning federal government.
Given its close connection to those purposes, a role morality for presidents and members of
Congress is appropriately described as constitutional, not merely political. This Article then
proposes some rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of constitutional role
morality, including a commitment to consult the political opposition before taking important
actions and a rebuttable presumption in favor of moderation and compromise. The Article also
explains how different actors in the American constitutional system should execute their
professional responsibilities if they are to make it more, rather than less, likely that such a role
morality will eventually be adopted and maintained. A final part anticipates objections, including
the concern that the vision offered here faces significant implementation problems.
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When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the
Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed
at a college table; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will.1
INTRODUCTION
Since at least the mid-twentieth century, constitutional law scholarship in the United
States has focused on the role of federal judges, not on the role of elected officials. Liberal
academics and scholarly judges had defended the constitutionality of the New Deal by arguing
that the judiciary should respect the democratically accountable decision-making of the political
branches on matters of social and economic regulation.2 Those liberals struggled to reconcile
their commitment to judicial deference in that sphere with the assertive judicial responses to
issues of civil rights and liberties that later arose.3
The anxieties of the leading lights of that scholarly generation, most notably Learned
Hand4 and Felix Frankfurter,5 made a lasting impact on their students in the next one. In 1962,
Alexander Bickel famously wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court was a “deviant institution in the
American democracy.”6 He coined the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” to name the
perceived problem of democratic legitimacy that arose when unelected judges told popular
majorities they were not permitted to govern as they preferred.7 Bickel’s distinction between
countermajoritarian courts and majoritarian presidents and Congresses would subsequently cast a
long intellectual shadow. As Barry Friedman observes, constitutional law scholars since Bickel
have been in the grip of an “academic obsession” with the countermajoritarian difficulty.8 Much
modern scholarship in constitutional law accepts the Bickelian dichotomy between federal
judges who are unelected and so (it is assumed to follow) do not represent “majority will,” and
politicians who stand for election and so (it is assumed to follow) do represent majority will.9 All
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See generally, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 160–61, 228–36 (2002).
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See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Friedman, supra note 2, at 202-15 (discussing Warren
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(rejecting the so-called double standard of judicial review in stating that “[o]ur power does not vary according to the
particular provision of the Bill of Rights which is invoked”).
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See Friedman, supra note 2, at 157 (discussing “the intellectual problem of justifying judicial review that
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THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1982) (“The central issue in the constitutional debate of the past twenty-five years
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such scholarship assumes that, in the American constitutional system, it is the proper role of
federal judges, not elected officials, that requires a normative account.
The same assumption animates constitutional law scholarship that imagines it has moved
on from Bickel. Such scholarship accepts all of the political science evidence establishing that
the Supreme Court is far more majoritarian, 10 and the political branches are far less
majoritarian, 11 than Bickel and his intellectual heirs imagined. Among constitutional law
scholars, however, that learning has been thought relevant mostly to theorizing about judicial
review,12 putting aside Sanford Levinson’s calls for constitutional redesign.13 The focus tends to
remain on judges, both the formal rules courts make for other actors, and the less formal norms
that govern judges themselves.14 The most consistent theme in the literature is law in judicial
hands, implemented through judicial procedures, with consequent attention to judicial role.15
will, while courts are illegitimate because they impede it”). John Hart Ely wrote that “we may grant until we’re blue
in the face that legislatures aren’t wholly democratic, but that isn’t going to make courts more democratic than
legislatures.” JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 67 (1980). He deemed
“ludicrous” efforts to justify judicial review based on the idea that “the legislature does not truly speak for the
people’s values, but the Court does.” Id. at 68. “There can be no doubt,” he repeated, “that the judicial branch, at
least at the federal level, is significantly less democratic than the legislative and executive.” Id. at 206 n.9. Larry
Kramer also deemed it “ludicrous” to think legislatures and courts are “comparable” in how much they “mirror or
translate popular will.” Larry Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 999 (2004).
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Most political scientists reject Bickel’s premise that judicial review presents a countermajoritarian
difficulty. For a discussion, see HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 20-21 (2d ed. 2016). Prominent works include THOMAS R.
MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT (2008); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989);
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James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to
Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004); and Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). Important legal scholarship similarly contests the premise of a
countermajoritarian Court. See generally, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009); Jack M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). For skepticism that
the Court is “majoritarian,” see generally Richard Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 117 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, A Coase Theorem for Constitutional Theory, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV.
583 (2010) (analyzing Friedman’s The Will of the People).
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There are, of course, exceptions. Paul Brest argues that conscientious legislators should regard
themselves as more legally constrained than a court is prepared to demand of them. See generally Paul Brest, The
Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975). Robin West urges
progressives to turn from the “adjudicated Constitution” to the “legislated Constitution, the Constitution looked to
by the conscientious legislator as he or she seeks to fulfill her political obligations.” Robin West, The Missing
Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 at 79 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel

3

Among academic constitutional lawyers, a role morality is widely deemed applicable to
federal judges. That role morality is intended to discipline judges beyond strictly legal restraints
on their behavior.16 Critically, however, judicial role morality is tied to a sense of the proper
place of judges in the constitutional scheme. For example, legal scholars write that federal judges
are supposed to possess reasons for their decisions and to offer them as justification for those
decisions, at least most of the time. Judges are supposed to be relatively constrained in their
decision-making and to proceed consistently and incrementally, at least most of the time. They
are supposed to worry about the countermajoritarian difficulty, perhaps regardless of the truth
value of Bickelian assertions. Judges are supposed to maintain the appearance (and reality) of
impartiality. Particular judges are celebrated for having possessed sound judgment and practiced
the virtue of statesmanship. When judges issue decisions to which Americans vigorously object,
their objections are unlikely to be dismissed by constitutional law scholars with conversation
stoppers like “appointments have consequences” or “it’s just judging” to issue such decisions.
By contrast, academic constitutional lawyers do not generally write that a role morality
should guide presidents and members of Congress. Following Bickel’s contemporary, Herbert
Wechsler, the field tends to view “politics” in America as an unprincipled realm in which elected
eds., 2009). Vicki Jackson defends the normative concept of “pro-constitutional” legislative representatives—that is,
“representatives whose goals are to advance the purposes of constitutional democracy within their own
constitutional system.” Vicki C. Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations of
Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (2015).
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments” focuses on the role of the political branches in producing
legitimate constitutional change and de-emphasizes the role of judges. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 2: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). Akhil Amar’s
scholarship also does not focus mostly on courts, let alone the legitimacy of judicial review. See generally, e.g.,
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTION]; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES
WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION].
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interpretation, see generally, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); David Strauss’s theory of common law
constitutionalism, see generally, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Cass Sunstein’s theory
of judicial minimalism in opinion writing, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); and the rise of first- and second-generation originalism, see generally
Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (2013). Even work on the
Constitution outside the courts focuses more on the relationship of social movements to judicial review than on their
relationship to the political branches. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) [hereinafter
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM]; FRIEDMAN, supra note 10; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
16

For a discussion of the claims made in this paragraph, see infra Part I.
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officials are free to exercise their wills to whatever extent formal electoral processes have vested
in them the legal authority to do so.17 When Americans voice objections to the employment of
partisan political power, most constitutional law scholars qua scholars are likely to just shrug and
conclude that the U.S. Constitution has nothing to do with the matter.
There is a basic problem with the enduring hold of Bickelian thinking over constitutional
law scholarship in the United States. Not only did Bickel internalize the conflicts of those who
had struggled to reconcile their posture toward the judiciary during the New Deal with a world in
which the subject matter of judicial decision-making had changed,18 but he also wrote less than a
decade after Brown and before the political branches began enacting civil rights legislation
aimed at disestablishing an apartheid social order. In such a period, the Court’s legitimacy was
perceived to be in question.19 It is thus understandable why Bickel would have been worried
about the Court’s potential countermajoritarianism, and about how to protect the Justices’
articulation of constitutional principles from being warped by the need to maintain the public
legitimacy of the Court.20 Of course, the conduct and legitimacy of the Supreme Court remains
worthy of extended scholarly attention and critique today. But Bickel’s time was very different
from our own, and, as a result, so were his most acute anxieties.
Consider some contemporary causes for concern. Americans today appear to be suffering
from a collapsed understanding of politics. Both culturally and conceptually, they increasingly
find themselves acting based upon an account of politics that verges on animus toward, and deep
distrust of, fellow Americans in the other political party.21 They tend to view politics as a realm
in which people are entitled to indulge their ideological appetites to the full extent legality
permits—they are free to take maximum advantage in every situation. Too often, citizens
imagine the American polity as populated by individuals who are so fundamentally alien from
them—so “other”—that they are more charitably disposed toward a hostile foreign power than
toward members of the other political party.22 “Those people,” the thinking seems to go, cannot
17

Wechsler’s distinction between the principled realm of judicial decision and the unprincipled realm of
political decision still resonates among constitutional law scholars. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[W]hether you are tolerant, perhaps more tolerant
than I, of the ad hoc in politics, with principle reduced to a manipulative tool, are you not also ready to agree that
something else is called for from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is
precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching
judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
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See Friedman, supra note 2, at 160–61, 228–36.
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See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 43
(1995) (“Brown represented a courageous gamble.”).
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See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 111–98 (advocating that the Court deploy “the passive virtues,” such as
standing doctrine, to protect legal principles from being distorted by the necessity of preserving public legitimation).
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See, e.g., Frank Bruni, I’m O.K.—You’re Pure Evil, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/im-ok-youre-pureevil.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-leftregion&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&_r=0 (“If not physically then
civically, we’re in a dangerous place when it comes to how we view, treat and talk about people we disagree with.
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See, e.g., Charles J. Sykes, The Danger of Ignoring Alex Jones, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/17/opinion/sunday/the-danger-of-ignoring-alex-
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be permitted to win the next election, or make the next Supreme Court appointment, or have their
most important values or interests accommodated in any way, because so much is perceived to
be at stake. Americans who are on the losing end of the most recent “razor’s edge” election feel
something akin to estrangement from the federal government.
Meanwhile, the federal government itself is increasingly dysfunctional; more often than
not, elected officials are unable to cooperate across party lines in order to execute the basic
responsibilities of the federal government in the constitutional scheme. For example, a
Democratic Senate ended the filibuster for lower federal court nominees in 2013 after alleging
unprecedented Republican obstruction.23 A Republican Senate did the same for Supreme Court
nominees in 2017 in order to overcome a Democratic filibuster of Republican nominee Neil
Gorsuch. 24 Senate Republicans so acted after holding Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat open for
roughly a year in order to prevent Democratic President Barack Obama from filling the vacancy
by appointing Chief Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.25
It remains to be seen whether it will again be possible to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court
when the same political party does not control both the White House and the Senate.
In the near term, at least, there seems little reason for optimism. For example, a
Republican Senate recently approved highly consequential tax legislation without any
Democratic input or even a single hearing, let alone the process that used to be followed:
“multiple congressional hearings, proposed statutory language and detailed reports from the taxwriting committees, all prepared well in advance of any vote” and “with the assistance of [Joint
Committee on Taxation] staff and with the input of Treasury Department experts.”26 In addition,
Republican President Donald J. Trump routinely flouts norms and conventions of proper
governmental behavior that previously had constrained presidents of both parties. 27 And the
Democrats, for their part, recently held up urgent funding legislation in order to extract a deal

jones.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-leftregion&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region (“We now have a politics deeply
infused with paranoia and distrust not only of our institutions but also of one another.”).
23

See Jeremy W. Winters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html.
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See Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy “Nuclear Option” to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-courtsenate.html?_r=0.
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See Mike DeBonis, Judge Dashes Merrick Garland’s Final, Faint Hope for a Supreme Court Seat,
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/11/18/judge-dashesmerrick-garlands-final-faint-hope-for-a-supreme-court-seat/?utm_term=.b518d565f272.
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See, e.g., Edward Kleinbard, Senators Picked Americans’ Pockets Via Degraded Tax Policy Process,
THE HILL (Dec. 4, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/363096-senators-picked-americans-pockets-viadegraded-tax-process.
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For discussions, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President
Donald Trump. 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018); Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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that would offer a path to citizenship to beneficiaries of the program known as Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA); a shutdown of the federal government ensued.28
Three characteristics of the problems discussed above stand out. First, they mostly
implicate the convictions and conduct of the public and the political branches, not the courts.
Second, they concern mindsets and behavior that, while ostensibly troubling, are not potentially
illegal. And third, that behavior, even where not illegal, raises concerns that are properly
denominated constitutional in the broad sense that they appear to call into question the long-term
health of the American constitutional system. Given the nature and potential magnitude of those
problems, it is time for constitutional law scholarship in the United States to escape the shadow
of Bickel’s generation (and that of his teachers). To help address the problems of our situation,
constitutional law scholars might follow the example of certain contemporary scholars of
statutory interpretation by focusing a bit less on the judiciary and a bit more on the political
branches.29 More specifically (and distinctively), constitutional law scholars might do for elected
officials what they have long done for judges: contribute to the development of a constitutional
role morality by identifying normative restraints on the discretion of politicians beyond the legal
restrictions imposed by the Constitution and federal law. This Article is offered in that spirit.30
What are the sources of a constitutional role morality for presidents and members of
Congress? Where is one to look for a role morality that demands more than compliance with the
law writ small? Rather than consult a general theory of morality or a political theory of
representation or political ethics, this Article focuses on the American constitutional system in
particular and suggests two good places to look. The first is a particular understanding of the
American commitment to democracy, which has implications not just for First Amendment
doctrine but also for the role responsibilities of representatives. As illuminated by the writings or
examples of Rousseau, Burke, Madison, Washington, and Jefferson, American representatives
have a duty to represent the whole and not just the part in order to manage the tension between
democracy and diversity in a strikingly heterogeneous political community that is nonetheless
committed to the ideal of collective self-governance. Such a community must confront the
question of how, and under what circumstances, electoral losers can fairly be thought of as selfgoverning. 31 The second source of a constitutional role morality rests upon a particular
understanding of the requirements of good institutional citizenship in a robust separation of
28

See, e.g., Caitlin Dickerson, What Is DACA? Who Are the Dreamers? Here Are Some Answers, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/daca-dreamers-shutdown.html.
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Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
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powers regime that is not intended to impair the ability of the federal government to function at
least tolerably well and that, in an era of polarization and distrust, increasingly threatens it with
dysfunction. On that view, it is critical to keep partisanship in the political branches within
reasonable bounds so that the federal government can fill executive and judicial offices, solve
multi-state collective action problems that the states cannot solve on their own, and protect civil
rights.32
Both sources of a constitutional role morality speak directly to the actual circumstances
of contemporary American political life: high levels of political polarization and ill will threaten
to render the tension between democracy and diversity impossible to reconcile, and to render the
federal government incapable of executing its basic responsibilities.33 More fundamentally, both
sources of a role morality constitute basic purposes of the Constitution—facilitating collective
self-governance and creating a functional federal government—that require more than
compliance with legal rules if they are to be vindicated. When presidents and members of
Congress respect the restraints imposed by constitutional role morality, they help accomplish
those constitutional purposes. A constitutional role morality for elected officials can be thought
of as occupying normative territory at the border between law and politics as conventionally
conceived—that is, between a realm of “hard” restraints on the exercise of discretion by elected
officials, and a realm of unlimited discretion by such officials. Official conduct that disregards
role restraints is anticonstitutional, even if it is not unconstitutional.
Specifying the contents of a constitutional role morality for elected officials poses a
formidable challenge, in part because elections do and should have significant consequences for
American governance. This Article nonetheless makes a preliminary attempt at identifying
rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of a role morality that can (modestly) limit
the stakes of losing elections while still enabling the prevailing party to govern and the federal
government to function effectively.34 The merits of the tentative proposals to follow, however,
are not critical at this point. This Article is primarily concerned with starting a normative
conversation, with showing that it is an important conversation, and with suggesting that
constitutional law professors (in addition to other legal scholars) are at least apt participants in
such conversations.
Constitutional law scholarship that develops the idea of a role morality for members of
the political branches will have implications for how different actors in the American
constitutional system ought to execute their own responsibilities if they are to make it more,
rather than less, likely that such a role morality will eventually be adopted and maintained.35
Most obviously, politicians who are tempted to exercise partisan power in aggressive ways
should consider not simply the legal authority that vests as a consequence of formal electoral
processes, but also their potential obligations to represent the whole and not just the part, and to
32

For development of this argument, see infra Part II.B.
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See, e.g., Philip Bump, Political Polarization Is Getting Worse. Everywhere, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2016),
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help the system function better and not worse. Although most politicians may be unlikely to
practice normative self-restraint very often in the short-to-medium run, investing in civic
education (contra current trends) could eventually have a positive impact on the constituents,
donors, party officials, media outlets, and others who constitute the environment in which elected
officials must function. And law teachers might consider operating within a longer time horizon
and developing ways to instruct their students—in their capacities as future politicians, not just
future judges—that a role morality applies to their own conduct. Law teachers might also engage
their students as citizens, as well as future lawyers, and instruct them that high levels of
polarization and animus between members of the two main political parties imperil the
constitutional system.
In the shorter term, there may be an implication for practices of political resistance. Few
would accept aggressive judicial behavior lying down just in virtue of asserted justifications that
“appointments have consequences” or “it’s just judging” for Supreme Court Justices to advance
ideological agendas. Likewise, opposition politicians, members of the news media, the
institutions of civil society, and concerned citizens need not simply accept assertions by those in
power (or their supporters) that “elections have consequences” or that “it’s just politics” for
elected officials to forcefully advance ideological agendas. Nor ought the opposition to limit its
pushback to considering whether a president is “legitimate” or whether a president has a
“mandate” to govern. Instead, the opposition should feel entitled to speak the language of
constitutional legitimacy to exercises of partisan power when politicians act as if they owe
nothing to Americans who did not vote for them and to the institutions in which they serve.
Part I discusses the longstanding concern of constitutional law scholars with judicial role
morality. Part II looks to the American commitment to democracy and the American
constitutional structure for normative sources of a role morality for elected officials. Part III
offers a preliminary sketch of the obligations of elected officials as part of their role morality.
Part IV identifies role implications for politicians, law teachers, and Americans who oppose
aggressive action by an administration or Congress. Part V anticipates objections.
Before proceeding, two clarifications are in order. First, although this Article argues for
role restraints on elected officials to combat extreme partisanship, it is important to bear in mind
that, if the argument were accepted, politicians would still retain the ability to pursue various
objectives consistent with their role morality, including goals they should feel morally obliged to
accomplish for others.36 A constitutional role morality for elected officials should not be viewed
as mostly constraining, any more than it should be so viewed for judges. Moreover, this Article
will show that a constitutional role morality for politicians opens up new possibilities for more
responsive and effective governance.
Second, solutions to the problems of polarization in contemporary American politics
obviously depend upon their causes. Because this Article does not examine those causes, it does
not offer short-to-medium run solutions beyond civic education, which cannot hurt and might
eventually help. Instead, the Article provides a normative account that can be discussed and
debated on its own terms. If enough Americans find it attractive, solutions will come in time.
36

See generally, e.g., West, supra note 14 (emphasizing the obligations of the conscientious legislator).
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I.

JUDICIAL ROLE MORALITY

The efforts of constitutional law scholars to develop a role morality for judges, one that it
linked to the perceived place of judges in the constitutional scheme, are sufficiently numerous
and familiar that they risk not being recognized as related and as having that purpose. Those
efforts may be described as a multi-generational scholarly and professional project of
emphasizing constraining conceptions of a judge’s institutional role. Such conceptions are of
course thought to include legal restraints on judicial conduct—for example, legal prohibitions on
taking bribes or adjudicating cases when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned
or when specific kinds of bias, prejudice, or conflicts of interest can be shown to exist in fact.37
But conceptions of judicial role are thought to impose more than just legal restraints on judges.
Concerns about unduly assertive judicial conduct have caused constitutional law scholars and
other members of the legal community to develop and advocate for operational limits on how
judges exercise their discretion.
Notably, proposed limits do not characteristically take the form of hard-edged legal
claims. For example, one does not typically hear assertions to the effect that “it would be illegal
for a judge to cast a vote against the constitutionality of a statute because she thinks the statute is
bad policy.” Instead, one tends to encounter a number of important ideas that sound in a different
register. As noted above, constitutional law scholars have long insisted that Supreme Court
Justices face a “countermajoritarian difficulty,”38 and their insistence may play a role in limiting
judicial discretion regardless of the truth value of the proposition. In addition, commentators
emphasize the importance of judicial reason giving.39 They propose ways of disciplining judges
to the virtue of consistency and securing related rule-of-law values from judicial decision
making.40 They endorse particular approaches to constitutional interpretation and reject others
based in part upon concerns about proper judicial role. 41 They insist on basic fairness to
litigants.42 They criticize judges who they do not believe are maintaining an appearance or reality
of impartiality off the bench.43 They advise judges to proceed incrementally.44 They defend the
37

See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (identifying circumstances in which judicial recusal is required).

38

See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.

39

See generally, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).

40

See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles,
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2007) (discussing how
best to “advance the goal of disciplining judges to the virtue of consistency”).
41

See generally, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 8 (identifying the kinds of arguments that participants in
American constitutional discourse, especially judges, conventionally employ).
42

See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for
Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 686–93 (2017) (discussing the principle of “fair play”).
43

See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, How Badly Is Neil Gorsuch Annoying the Other Supreme Court Justices?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-badly-is-neil-gorsuch-annoyingthe-other-supreme-courtjustices?mbid=nl_170930_Daily&CNDID=48074089&spMailingID=12041378&spUserID=MTczODY1MTk3OD
M1S0&spJobID=1242559629&spReportId=MTI0MjU1OTYyOQS2 (criticizing the speech Justice Gorsuch gave to
a conservative group at the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C., and the speech he delivered at the
University of Louisville, where he was introduced by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell). Justice Ginsburg
was also criticized for her comments about President Trump when he was the Republican nominee. See, e.g.,
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idea of “judicial restraint.”45 They expect judges to respect institutional norms of appropriate
judicial conduct. 46 They criticize judges who behave in an intemperate fashion. 47 They
underscore a number of judicial virtues—a sense of proportion, the practice of moderation, the
exercise of sound judgment, and the possession of good timing and tact—that fall under the
general heading of judicial statesmanship, which counsels judges to take some account of the
conditions of a court’s own public legitimacy.48 Commentators also condemn judicial willfulness
or “activism”—that is, unjustifiably assertive judicial decision making.49
Few members of the legal community would recommend any of the foregoing ideas
always or invariably. On the contrary, commentators proffer a variety of presumptions,
exceptions, and countervailing considerations. To take the most obvious example, almost no one
is prepared to argue that Brown v. Board of Education was wrongly decided, and Brown was of
course not an exemplar of judicial restraint. 50 Even so, commentators frequently urge
constraining ideas upon judges. What is more, they do so notwithstanding a lack of consensus
about which ideas to push, both at a particular time and over time. Legal scholar Craig Green
underscores the disagreements over judicial role that continuously unfold in history:
[V]igorous debates over judicial role continue because judicial norms are flexible
and change over time. Each new crop of judges, lawyers, and scholars must learn,
experience, and consider issues of judicial role for themselves. At any point in
time, certain notions of judicial role will be dominant, others subordinate, and
others mired in competitive struggle. The legal community’s unending
Editorial, Justice Ginsburg’s Inappropriate Comments on Donald Trump, WASH. POST (July 12, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-ginsburgs-inappropriate-comments-on-donaldtrump/2016/07/12/981df404-4862-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html?utm_term=.364c6e5b79be.
44

See generally, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 15 (articulating a theory of judicial minimalism in opinion

writing).
45

See generally, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005) (arguing for a strong theory of judicial precedent on grounds of judicial
restraint).
46

See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the
Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEORGETOWN L.J. 255, 319–21 (2017) (discussing how the concepts of
historical gloss and constitutional conventions relate to questions of judicial independence and power).
47

For example, Justice Scalia, for all his gifts and influence, was capable of writing with a nastiness that
arguably served neither himself nor the Court nor the country well. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2630 (2015) (“If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began [how
the majority opinion does], I would hide my head in a bag.”).
48

See generally, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008)
(theorizing the phenomenon of judicial statesmanship and its relationship to professional legal reasoning); Robert
Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319
(2010) (similar).
49

See generally Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009). For
a critique of how motivated political actors deploy activism rhetoric to mask substantive objections in process
objections, see generally Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555 (2010).
Although it is important to call out manipulative use of activism rhetoric, such rhetoric can help fashion role
restraints on judges.
50

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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participation in cultural contests over judicial role is an under-appreciated
precondition of our system of judicial discretion within limits.51
Disagreement about which restraints to impose has not simply undermined the project of
persuading federal judges to respect the limits of their appropriate role in the constitutional
scheme. Disagreement has also helped construct the very role constraints whose contents are in
question. Disagreement has also validated the general idea that such restraints exist.
Constitutional law scholars, as well as law teachers more generally, seek to bring the
above ideas closer to reality in a variety of ways. In their writing, they develop principles for
judges to consider. They mobilize histories of judges who are thought to have exemplified good
judging.52 They identify judicial decisions that form part of the legal “canon.”53 They critique
judicial decisions that fall short of proposed principles, including decisions that they identify as
anticanonical.54 They challenge their students (future judges among them) to consider what good
and bad judging looks like in a variety of settings. In all of those efforts, judicial biographies and
judicial decisions serve as case studies of success or human frailty in executing the
responsibilities of the judicial role. 55 And judges themselves serve as educators by teaching
lessons about judicial role to their law clerks,56 some of whom will go on to become judges.57

51

Craig Green, What Does Richard Posner Know About How Judges Think?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 625, 661–62
(2010) (emphasis added) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)).
52

See generally, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES (3rd ed. 2007); Green, supra note 51, at 627 (“As White’s book illustrates, judicial methods
emerge from complex interactions among society, politics, and biography. Thus, the strongest determinants of how
judges think may be the historical stories and principles through which the legal community celebrates judicial
heroes and triumphs, while condemning villains and failures.”).
53

See generally, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 964 (1998) (calling for a revitalized constitutional canon, one that is less centered on decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court).
54

See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 379 (2011) (defining the “anticanon” as
“the set of cases whose central propositions all legitimate decisions must refute”).
55

See Green, supra note 51, at 646 (“Our history-laden system of legal education places questions of
judicial role front and center, especially in cases that are nonroutine. Even as future judges (i.e., law students) learn
the content of historical cases and rules, these same episodes yield instructive examples of proper judicial conduct
and methods.” (footnote omitted)).
56

Notably, the ethics guide that the Federal Judicial Center prepares for law clerks is framed in terms of
“maintaining the public trust.” See Federal Judicial Center, Maintaining the Public Trust, Ethics for Federal Judicial
Law Clerks 1 (4th ed. 2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/Maintaining-Public-Trust-4D-FJC-Public2013.pdf (“The parties and the public accept judges’ rulings because they trust the system to be fair and impartial.
Maintaining this trust is crucial to the continued success of our courts.”). I thank Marin Levy for this reference.
57

See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, The Secret History of the Chief Justice’s Obamacare Decision, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 215–216 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian
E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013) (arguing that Justice Brandeis instilled his broad view of Congress’s
taxing authority in his law clerk Henry Friendly, who in turn instilled it in his law clerk John Roberts, so that “[t]he
tax power strand in Roberts’s Obamacare opinion was made available by a professional culture of lawyers stretching
back into the beginnings of the modern state”). Witt concludes that “[l]aw is located, in part, in the professional
identities of the men and women who make it.” Id. at 222.
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It is likely impossible to know—to determine empirically—how much of a long-term
effect such ideas and the rhetoric associated with them have had or can have on judicial
behavior. Court watchers who believe that the Justices are extraordinarily self-confident and
assertive regardless of what others think may be inclined to doubt the efficacy of those methods.
Much depends on the individual judge—for example, the extent to which he or she is attuned to
potential threats to the Court’s institutional legitimacy and is prepared to take steps to preserve it.
Yet it may be telling that constitutional law scholars (and the broader legal culture) keep
generating such constraining conceptions; perhaps that would not keep happening if they made
no difference at all. Those who have worked for judges or who interact with them in other ways
are often left with the impression that most of them worry about staying within their limited
institutional role even if they do not always seem to do so. And even such assertive, recent
interventions as Shelby County v. Holder58 and Obergefell v. Hodges59 were actually culminating
events; the judicial majorities that produced them proceeded incrementally and with apparent
attention to the views of other actors.60
More generally, it is easy to lose sight of the profoundly important questions that modern
federal judges (whether named Garland or Gorsuch) will not decide assertively or at all,
including matters of war and peace, the direction of federal fiscal or monetary policy, and the
continued operation of various hard-wired provisions of the Constitution. Although Supreme
Court Justices no doubt possess a great deal of power in modern America, they have not, on the
whole, used their power to unwind all or most of the work of the political branches. That is not
because anything in the Constitution or federal law somehow forcibly prevents them from doing
so. Rather, it is because scholars, the public, and the Justices themselves have all internalized
some relatively strong ideas about how federal judges ought to behave in the American
constitutional system.
None of that is to suggest, however, that concerns about efficacy are unreasonable. They
are reasonable. Even so, it has seemed worthwhile to a great many constitutional law scholars to
cultivate a culture of role constraints on judges. The balance of this Article will argue that it is
similarly worthwhile to develop a role morality for presidents and members of Congress, even if
concerns about efficacy are even more acute in the context of the political branches.61 The next
Part suggests that the success of the American constitutional project depends in part upon elected
officials who understand the normative limits of their institutional roles.

58

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

59

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

60

See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (precursor to Shelby County);
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (precursor to Obergefell); see also generally Neil S. Siegel,
Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (2014) (analyzing
the potential reasons for the Court’s unusual opinion in Windsor); Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the
Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (2017) (discussing the interaction between the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts beginning in Windsor and ending in Obergefell).
61

This Article does not argue that the same role morality applies to judges and politicians. They occupy
different institutional roles. For example, judges likely have greater obligations of reason giving and consistency
than do elected officials, because judges have special obligations to maintain the rule of law and legislators (who
have many more colleagues than judges) must often compromise to get anything done.
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A predictable objection to the idea that role restraints beyond legal fidelity attach to
political office, just as they apply to judicial office, is that the judicial analogy is misguided
because such restraints apply only to countermajoritarian institutions and the political branches
are majoritarian. That way of thinking is, of course, part of what Bickel, his teachers, and his
contemporaries bequeathed to subsequent generations of constitutional law scholars. One
response is that the federal electoral system has countermajoritarian components that are both
numerous and severe, 62 as does the federal policymaking process. 63 Those components can
produce presidents and parties in control of Congress that lack majority or plurality support in
the nation for their elections and priorities.
Another response is that the objection is misguided even on its own terms because a
constitutional role morality is important for members of institutions that attract majority support.
Consider initially the case of judges. The Supreme Court tends to be a more majoritarian
institution than Bickel ever imagined, and yet (or is it because?) a role morality is widely thought
applicable to the conduct of the Justices, including when they possess majority support for their
decisions. Moreover, the Justices are expected to respect role restraints when they decide cases
not requiring constitutional judicial review, such as those involving statutory interpretation.
Likewise, one should not conclude that a constitutional role morality is inapplicable to
the conduct of elected officials when they possess majority support for the decisions. As
explained in the next Part, realizing the ideal of democracy as collective self-governance does
62

Countermajoritarian aspects include the malapportionment of the Senate, the Electoral College method of
electing the president, gerrymandering aided by computer technology, the more efficient distribution of Republican
voters around the nation, and a federal statute that requires single-member congressional districts. For discussions of
political branch countermajoritarianism, see supra note 11 and accompanying text; Nate Cohn, Why Democrats
Can’t Win the House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/upshot/why-democratscant-win.html (explaining why “clustering” of Democrats in urban areas impedes the ability of the Democratic Party
to gain control of the House even when the party enjoys a national political majority); Emily Badger, As American
as Apple Pie?: The Rural Vote’s Disproportionate Slice of Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/upshot/as-american-as-apple-pie-the-rural-votes-disproportionate-slice-ofpower.html (discussing the effects of rural favoritism in the constitutional structure on the outcomes of elections for
president, House seats, and Senate seats); AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, at 413
(noting that “[s]ince 1967, the single-member-district statute has been a fixed feature of the U.S. election code”).
One should add low voter turnout, the fact that Americans who vote are whiter, older, and wealthier than the
population as a whole, and the imposition of voting restrictions despite no credible evidence of a significant problem
of in-person voter fraud. For discussions, see Lain, supra note 11, at 154, and LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF
VOTER FRAUD (2010).
63

Countermajoritarian aspects include the bicameralism and presentment requirements, the latter of which
grants veto power to the president. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Congressional rules and practices, as well as
political dynamics, also add to the countermajoritarian characteristics of the federal policymaking process. See
LEVINSON, supra note 11, at 52–53 (discussing the Senate filibuster); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN,
THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 45 (2006)
(observing that “independent, unrepresentative, and constituency-controlled committees can distort legislative
outcomes and frustrate chamber majorities and national interests”); Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive
Approaches (and One Right One) to Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014) (arguing
that “large donors, lobbyists, and others who bundle contributions are able to obtain much broader access than others
to legislators and staffers to make the case for legislative action (or inaction)” and that “[a]ccess does not guarantee
legislative success, but it is usually a prerequisite”); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From
Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361 (2008) (concluding that
“countermajoritarian policymaking is being enabled by almost every trend in American politics”).
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not depend upon whether elected officials earn majority backing. In today’s America, for
example, even when a president is elected by a popular majority, a large percentage of the
population is likely to oppose his or her priorities. As also explored below, ensuring the basic
functionality of the federal government does not turn on whether the institutions controlled by
politicians are best described as majoritarian. For example, the appointments and legislative
processes can grind to a halt or otherwise leave much to be desired when different politicians
who control different veto gates were each elected by different popular majorities.
As will be discussed, role restraints on both judges and elected officials may well loosen
up when supermajorities of Americans support their proposed decisions.64 For example, given
recent and dramatic changes in public sentiment regarding the permissibility of same-sex
marriage, the Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges may have been more justifiable in 2015
than it would have been in 2005 or 1995.65 Likewise, a president who enjoys 70 percent support
may possess a special democratic warrant to act within the bounds set by the law (which includes
respect for individual rights). But that is a far cry from the suggestion that
countermajoritarianism exhausts the circumstances in which a role morality applies to elected
officials.
Perhaps the objection could be reframed by turning from the question of whether the
institution under consideration is countermajoritarian to whether its members are elected. On that
view, a constitutional role morality applies only if members of the institution are unelected, like
federal judges, and not when they are elected, like presidents and members of Congress. It is not
clear, however, why elections should make a decisive difference. It has just been noted that
winning a federal election does not necessarily confer upon a president or member of Congress a
majoritarian democratic warrant to act. Moreover, elected state judges are not generally thought
to be unencumbered by a constitutional role morality, even if they may be less or differently
encumbered. 66 One may applaud or decry the greater political accountability of state judges
relative to federal judges, but the way state judges typically act in court, the various procedures
they are required to follow, and the ways they are expected to justify their decisions are more
similar to federal judges than different. Most importantly, holding elections does not resolve the
problems discussed below: securing both collective self-governance and a well-functioning
federal government. At most, the greater level of accountability associated with elections (as
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See infra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the case of elected officials who enjoy
supermajority support over a sustained period of time to make significant legal and political change).
65

135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). This Article does not engage the complex questions of whether and when
changes in public opinion potentially justify particular judicial interpretations of the Constitution. Public opinion
may be relevant as part of the best living constitutionalist understanding of what a constitutional provision means, or
because statesmanship previously counseled against the expression of the best understanding. For work in the
former category, see generally Lain, supra note 11. For work in the latter category, see supra note 48, infra note
160, and accompanying text.
66

According to David Pozen, the fact that many state judges are popularly elected or retained potentially
changes what role fidelity demands of them, so that it is inappropriate to apply to them normative models that
presuppose the life tenure of federal judges. See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 2047, 2083–86 (2010) (“The notion of majoritarian review . . . holds out the possibility that
courts should flexibly interpret the law to reflect the contemporaneous beliefs of the people. The notion of role
fidelity, furthermore, holds out the possibility that elected courts have special license to do this.”).
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opposed to life tenure) suggests that elected officials should be less restrained by a constitutional
role morality than are federal judges, not that politicians should not be restrained at all.

II.

SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE MORALITY

Why should elected officials owe anything to their political opponents, or to the nation as
a whole, or to the institutions in which they serve? Framed more precisely, what are sources of a
constitutional role morality for the elected officials of the national government? This Part locates
those sources in two basic purposes of the Constitution whose accomplishment requires more
than compliance with legal rules. 67 The first is vindicating the American commitment to
democracy as collective self-governance. What is needed to achieve that purpose is illuminated
by longstanding thinking in democratic theory—thinking that was reflected in the words and
deeds of prominent American Founders and early Presidents—about the duty of representatives
to represent the whole and not just the part. The second purpose is creating a reasonably wellfunctioning federal government. Accomplishing that purpose in a robust separation of powers
regime requires politicians to keep partisanship within reasonable bounds by practicing good
institutional citizenship.
Before proceeding, it is worth addressing an objection at the outset. The literature on
political representation in normative and positive political theory is so robust and varied that one
might question what constitutional law scholars could possibly add to academic discussions
about the role responsibilities of elected officials. 68 This Article provides one answer to that
question by doing what the political theory literature characteristically does not do: draw upon a
judicial analogy and tie arguments about the roles of the president and members of Congress in
particular (as opposed to representatives more generally) to claims about the success of the
American constitutional project in particular (as opposed to democracy or constitutional
democracy more generally). What is required to sustain the U.S. Constitution in history is a
subject to which academic constitutional lawyers can lay at least as much claim as political
scientists. Adequately addressing the problem requires intimate familiarity with the American
constitutional structure as specified in the text of the Constitution, as built out over time by
elected officials, and as interpreted by the federal courts. Meeting the problem also requires an
understanding of the functions that the Constitution exists to fulfill. Indeed, the participation of
constitutional law scholars in scholarly discussions of the problem may be essential: it would be
difficult to fully address the relationship between official roles and the constitutional project
without a deep appreciation of the Constitution as law.

67

There are, of course, other constitutional purposes, and law alone is likely insufficient to accomplish
them. Rather than attempt to be comprehensive, this Article focuses on two such purposes that are under especially
severe stress in current, polarized times.
68

The most influential modern work is HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). For an
overview of the literature, see Suzanne Dovi, Political Representation, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/political-representation/. For useful essays, see POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 2010). For further discussion of the literature, see infra notes 97–100. For
additional citations to the literature, see Jackson, supra note 14, at 1749 n.87.
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A.

A Substantive Conception of Democracy

Americans are committed to democracy as their ideal form of government, but what does
that commitment entail? A persuasive substantive understanding of American democracy can be
found in Frank Michelman’s emphasis on democracy as “self-rule,” the conviction that “the
American people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves
collectively.” 69 Democracy as collective self-rule—collective self-governance—cannot
persuasively be cashed out in terms of a simple voting procedure (like majority rule) that
determines electoral winners and losers. On such a conception of democracy, there seems no
good answer to the question of how electoral losers can be said to govern themselves when
electoral winners impose their will on them.
“A central problem of collective self-government that goes back at least to Rousseau,”
Robert Post writes, “revolves around the question of how, in the face of manifest and
indissoluble differences, we may be said to govern ourselves through collective selfdetermination.” 70 “Why,” Post asks, “is every majoritarian enactment not also an act of
oppression against a minority?”71 Rousseau was more helpful in framing the question than in
formulating an attractive answer. His idea was that, after a process of majoritarian
decisionmaking, the individual will of each citizen would be merged with the general will of all,
so that, in obeying the general will, each citizen will “obey only himself and remain as free as
before.”72 Rousseau did not adequately grapple with the stubborn fact of political disagreement
when citizens are free to express their convictions and pursue their interests.73
In more recent times, a wide range of democratic theorists has more plausibly posited that
a feeling of self-governance can be instilled in citizens when electoral winners and losers alike
are free to participate in the formation of public opinion to which electoral politics and
subsequent policymaking are subservient. On that view, “the normative essence of democracy is
. . . located in the communicative processes necessary to instill a sense of self-determination, and
in the subordination of political decision-making to these processes.” 74 Identifying collective
69

Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500–01 (1988).
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Robert C. Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 429, 433
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Id.

(1998).
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JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 49–50
(Victor Gourevitch ed., 1997) (1762).
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In writing those (in)famous words, Rousseau was referring to fundamental decisions of the “sovereign”
people, which set the basic terms of the political community for all its members. He was not referring to acts of the
“government” (including, in the United States today, the courts), whose more mundane role is to administer the
fundamental law previously approved by a majority of the people. For a discussion of the distinction between
“sovereignty” and “government” developed by Hobbes, Rousseau, and other political theorists, see generally David
Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Originalism: A Review of Richard Tuck’s The Sleeping
Sovereign, 127 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018). This Article is concerned with decisions that Rousseau would
categorize as acts of government, not sovereignty. Even (or, perhaps, especially) at the level of sovereignty,
however, it is not clear how majority rule produces self-rule by citizens who are outvoted.
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POST, supra note 19, at 185. See id. at 184–86 (discussing the theorizing of Rousseau, Hans Kelsen,
Benjamin Barber, John Dewey, Durkheim, Jürgen Habermas, and John Rawls). A potential ambiguity in the
theorizing of dialogic theorists of democracy is whether there is a fact of the matter regarding whether citizens are
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self-governance (and not a voting procedure like majority rule) as “the normative essence of
democracy” helps explain why the modern Supreme Court describes the First Amendment “as
the guardian of our democracy,” 75 even though the Court wields free-speech principles as
authority for instructing some popular or legislative majority that it cannot govern just as it
wishes. As Post writes, “[t]he Amendment serves to limit majoritarian enactments, so
‘democracy’ cannot in this context be equated with simple majoritarianism.”76 “In fact,” Post
continues, “majoritarianism, from the perspective of traditional First Amendment doctrine, is
merely a mechanism for decision-making that we adopt to reflect the deeper value of selfgovernment . . . .”77
It is unlikely, however, that First Amendment doctrine alone can fully accomplish the
constitutional purpose of securing collective self-governance. As vital as the freedom to
communicate on political matters is, it may go only so far in instilling in electoral losers a
genuine sense of self-determination. Especially in a polarized community in which a great deal is
perceived to turn on which political party wins each and every election, subordinating
governmental decisionmaking to the communicative processes protected by the Amendment may
not be enough to manage the tension between democracy and diversity. A potential democratic
virtue of judicially enforceable individual rights—beyond protections for speech and voting—is
that they take certain fundamental matters off the table for reconsideration at each election,
thereby permitting electoral losers to retain a sense of self-governance at least to some extent.78
But just as participation in the formation of public opinion may not suffice for electoral
losers to experience themselves as self-governing, neither may rights protections. Citizens
possess a variety of interests and commitments that they regard as profoundly important—
indeed, potentially more important than some of the rights they enjoy. And those interests are
potentially fair game in the political process. What may also be required for a political regime of
electoral winners and losers to more genuinely approximate the American ideal of collective
self-governance is an internalized sense among elected officials that they owe something not
only to citizens who voted for them, but also to those who voted against them and to the polity as
a whole—that, in virtue of having won the previous election, they have assumed some
responsibility to look after not just the interests and values of their supporters, but also of their
political opponents and of the entire nation.
ruling themselves, or whether the self-governance about which dialogic theorists write is instead a matter of what
citizens tell themselves. While the latter possibility may suffice for the sociological legitimacy of a political regime
(that is, legitimacy conceived of as a psychological willingness to assent to state force), actual normative legitimacy
(that is, legitimacy according to some higher vision of constitutional democracy as a picture of part of the good life)
probably requires some minimum threshold of actual self-governance in order to avoid the damning objection that
citizens are driven to storytelling so that they can live under the pleasing illusion of self-rule.
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Such a constitutional role morality is supported by Edmund Burke’s general conception
of the duty of a legislator, which he articulated in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol.79
He delivered the speech at the conclusion of the 1774 election, in which he was chosen to serve
as one of two representatives of Bristol in the House of Commons. 80 The other successful
candidate, Henry Cruger, had endorsed the right of constituents to instruct representatives on
how to vote in Parliament.81 In response, Burke rejected such mandatory “instructions,” as they
were called.82
Given the issue that prompted the speech, Burke had no occasion to address the
responsibility of legislators vis-à-vis those who did not vote for them. But his general statement
regarding the role of a representative has implications for that issue. “Facing his constituents,
both those who had voted for him and those who had not,”83 Burke emphasized the duty of
members of Parliament to represent the whole and not just the part:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests;
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents
and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one
interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought
to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member
of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have
an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of
the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as any
other, from any endeavour to give it effect.84
Burke imagined representatives as trustees, not as delegates.85 In his view, representatives were
charged with following their own understanding of the best course of conduct to pursue for the
polity as a whole, which on particular issues may differ from the wishes of the citizens who
voted for them (and may at least partially reflect the understanding of those who did not). “It was
necessary to be sensitive to local opinion, and equally to the sentiments of the nation at large,”
the prominent Burke biographer Richard Bourke writes of Burke’s views.86 But “the highest role
of a representative was to deliberate on the national interest, and for this they would have to

79

EDMUND BURKE, SPEECH TO THE ELECTORS OF BRISTOL (NOV. 3, 1774), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, Ch. 13, Doc. 7 (1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html.
80

For discussions, see RICHARD BOURKE, EMPIRE & REVOLUTION: THE POLITICAL LIFE OF EDMUND BURKE
373–90 (2015), and James Conniff, Burke, Bristol, and the Concept of Representation, 30 W. POL. Q. 329, 332–41
(1977).
81

BOURKE, supra note 80, at 381.

82

Id.; Conniff, supra note 80, at 332–33.

83

BOURKE, supra note 80, at 381.

84

BURKE, supra note 79.

85

Conniff, supra note 80, at 336.

86

BOURKE, supra note 80, at 384.

19

subordinate particular interests to the common good, and interpret popular feeling in accordance
with their own prudence.”87
In the same speech, Burke declared that “government and legislation are matters of
reason and judgment, and not of inclination,” and he rhetorically asked “what sort of reason is
that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and
another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles
distant from those who hear the arguments?” 88 Another student of Burke’s thought, James
Conniff, accordingly underscores that Burke viewed governance as not simply a matter of “will”
but of “judgment” about “what is best to be done,” which requires deliberation among
representatives, who are characteristically more informed about public affairs than their
constituents.89
At the same time, Burke believed that representatives must defend their votes and other
conduct in office.90 He also believed that they must ultimately submit to the judgment of their
constituents—as Burke himself did when he withdrew from the 1780 election upon realizing that
he had alienated too many of his constituents to be returned to Parliament.91 (He had disagreed
with them on, among other things, the government’s policy in America.92) But Burke’s eventual
rejection by his constituents did not alter his conception of the theoretical relationship between
representatives and voters that he had expressed six years earlier.93
Americans living today need not accept a full-fledged (and frankly elitist) conception of
elected representatives as trustees, let alone Burke’s views on virtual representation,94 to see the
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value in having presidents and members of Congress who have partially internalized a Burkean
point of view. A Burkean perspective helps illuminate why it is deeply problematic for a
representative to regard constituents who did not vote for her as outside her circle of concern.
And, in circumstances like the contemporary United States, in which geography has taken on a
partisan dimension, a Burkean vantage point also helps explain why it is troubling for a
representative to vote to shift costs from her district or state onto others.95
To be clear, this Article emphasizes themes that are most strongly associated with the
trustee model of representation, as opposed to the delegate model,96 in the conviction that those
themes are most absent (and needed) in contemporary American politics, most directly
connected to the American ideal of democracy as collective self-governance, and most reflective
of the values animating constitutional provisions that set fixed terms (of two-to-six years) for
federal elected officials and do not permit instructions to, or recall of, those officials. 97 The
Article does not, however, mean to reject the insights offered by the other traditions. 98 For
example, the delegate model of representation, which characteristically instructs a representative
to follow the wishes of her constituents, straightforwardly explains why it is wrong for the
representative to betray her own supporters by sacrificing their concerns to those of her wealthy
donors or herself. The distinctions among the traditions are easily overstated, and nuanced
theorists who write in one tradition also emphasize themes from the others. 99 Americans
reasonably make contradictory demands of representatives. Moreover, Hanna Pitkin famously
emphasized the paradoxical nature of the concept of representation; urged theorists to stop trying
to resolve the paradox; and suggested that representatives may think of themselves as both
trustees and delegates.100
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Granting all that, one can still be forgiven for asking skeptical questions about what it can
mean for an often-divided people to still constitute “one nation, with one interest, that of the
whole.”101 But just as a crude legal realism can be self-fulfilling when legal actors reason from a
realist point of view, the spirit of Burke’s perspective can be conducive to the development of a
constitutional role morality that prompts elected officials to see beyond their own political base.
Of course, the caution that “realism yields realism” risks provoking the response that “blind faith
yields suckers.” Such a response is especially tempting at moments of exasperation after learning
about the latest political outrage committed by the “other side.” The challenge may be to avoid
cynicism on the one hand and naiveté on the other—to develop a more inspiring account of
American politics that realism can nonetheless potentially accept as true at some future time.102
On the American side of the Atlantic, James Madison articulated a Burkean perspective,
at least in part, in his public advocacy in support of the Constitution’s ratification.103 Madison
decried both majority and minority faction in Federalist 10, and he emphasized the importance
of “refin[ing] and enlarge[ing] the public views, by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and
whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.”104 “Under such a regulation,” he continued, “it may well happen that the public
voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public
good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.” Madison’s
representatives, like Burke’s, would ideally pursue the “public good” instead of the narrow
interests of their constituents105—or themselves.106 “As there is a degree of depravity in mankind
which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust,” Madison wrote in Federalist 55,
“so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher
degree than any other form.”107
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To be sure, Madison is typically viewed as having been a proponent of the delegate
model of representation,108 Because he believed that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be
at the helm,” his “principa[l]” solution to the problem of majority faction was structural, not
Burkean.109 He endorsed extending the sphere of republican government to encompass greater
social heterogeneity, thereby making majority factions less likely to form and, if they do form,
less likely to act in concert effectively.110 Madison was thus suggesting that the contents and
interactions of citizen preferences in the national legislature of the extended republic would help
ameliorate the problems associated with poor representatives. It is important to note, however,
that Madison emphasized both extending the sphere and securing high-quality representatives.
“In the 1780s,” Gordon Wood writes, “James Madison had his doubts about this moral capacity
of the people stretched to the limit, but even he admitted that ordinary people had to have
sufficient ‘virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom’ or ‘no theoretical checks,
no form of government, can render us secure.’”111
Notably, Madison’s objective in extending the sphere was to force greater consensus in
political decision-making. “In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great
variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces,” Madison wrote at the end of Federalist
51, “a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other
principles than those of justice and the general good.”112 Madison’s two approaches are thus
potentially related in that public-spirited representatives may be necessary to prevent the
extended sphere from causing negotiation and coalition-building in Congress to fail routinely.113
That risk, whose associated costs have increased substantially over time as Americans have come
to expect more of the federal government than they did in Madison’s day, is discussed in the next
sub-Part.
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The presidency of George Washington was practically obsessed with ideas about proper
behavior by government officials. Washington was mindful that Article II did not define “[t]he
executive Power” 114 with anything approaching the precision with which Articles I and III
defined the federal legislative and judicial powers, respectively. He was also aware that the ways
in which he chose to execute his responsibilities would likely set precedents for future
presidents.115 Washington made fateful decisions with respect to recognizing and derecognizing
foreign governments, communicating (including in secret) with foreign governments and
negotiating treaties without the Senate’s prior knowledge, seeking Senatorial consent but not
advice in the treaty-making process, making the ultimate decision (after Senate consent) to ratify
treaties himself in the name of the nation, and insisting that cabinet members served at his
pleasure and so could be removed without cause and without Senate consent. 116 Although
Washington mostly (and appropriately) defended the authority of the presidency in those
episodes, he also insisted upon obtaining congressional authorization before engaging in any
non-defensive use of the military (most notably against Indian tribes).117
Most significant for present purposes is an observation by Akhil Amar: “Washington, by
temperament and philosophy, was a consensus-seeker.”118 Just as “[w]ar councils had served him
well when he was a battlefield general,” so “in his vision of public service, patriotic officials of
all stripes should ideally converge on nonpartisan solutions when presented with the same
facts.”119 As a result, Washington “sought advice from his departmental heads even on topics
beyond the strict boundaries of their respective departmental assignments, and later presidents
followed suit.” 120 Relatedly, Washington put rivals (such as Hamilton and Jefferson) in his
cabinet. And during his first term, he started a presidential tradition of visiting the states in order
to interact with Americans, including long trips up through New England and then down through
the South—all thirteen states—in an effort to foster national unity, which he understood the
nation would require if it were going to endure.121
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In addition, Washington’s patriotic insistence on renouncing power—first after successful
military command, and then after serving for eight years as president—reflected his conviction
that continued power was improper and dangerous, even if not unlawful, and so not in the best
interests of the nation. Washington played the initial, pivotal role in establishing the
constitutional convention against presidents serving more than two terms, which was legally
permissible prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment in 1951. 122 Washington
stepped down, and it was generally thought thereafter that it would be improper to deviate from
his example. Ratification of the 22nd Amendment, which legally limited presidents to two terms,
likely signified that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) had contravened the convention
(or, perhaps, had availed himself of an emergency exception to it),123 not that the convention had
never existed.124
Even as much of a majoritarian and a partisan as Thomas Jefferson was moved to voice
an inclusive conception of American governance in his First Inaugural Address. (Presidents often
speak that way after a bruising election campaign, and it may be unduly cynical to dismiss their
addresses simply as cheap talk, as opposed to efforts to appeal to their and our better selves.)
Jefferson spoke after a deeply divisive contest between the incumbent Federalist Party and
Jefferson’s own Democratic Republican Party that was ultimately settled in the House of
Representatives. “[T]hough the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail,” he said, “that will,
to be rightful, must be reasonable; . . . the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws
must protect, and to violate would be oppression.” 125 Continuing, he famously declared that
“[w]e are all republicans: we are all federalists.”126 To Jefferson, such sentiments were part of
“the creed of our political faith; the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the
services of those we trust.”127 He added that “should we wander from them in moments of error
or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace,
liberty and safety.”128
For Burke, Madison, Washington, Jefferson, and a host of eminent academic theorists,
democratic politics is not persuasively viewed as simply licensing the public indulgence of one’s
ideological appetites or the exercise of one’s will. Democracy is also a principled realm, one that
both enables and constrains. In such a realm, having the legal power to accomplish an objective
does not make it appropriate to do so. As Eric Posner recently put the point simply but
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powerfully, “[t]he president’s authority rests on trust and discretion, not on triumph of the
will.”129
Governance that is narrowly partisan can strain the relationships of trust that are
necessary to make collective self-governance realizable to an appreciable extent in the United
States. A constitutional role morality that tasks elected officials with trying in good faith to
achieve some level of inclusivity and bipartisan support reinforces those relationships of trust.
Elected officials may often fail to achieve such support, and sometimes they should fail: just as
bare democratic majorities can be right or wrong about profoundly important matters, so can
supermajorities. But it may be worth keeping in mind that Madison was not thinking as a
partisan when he supported adding rights provisions to the original Constitution so as to “render
it as acceptable to the whole people of the United States, as it has been found acceptable to a
majority of them.”130 Likewise, Lincoln did not have narrow partisan majorities in mind when he
poignantly resolved that the American nation “shall have a new birth of freedom” and that
“government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.”131 That
much is evident from his own efforts at national reconciliation—without compromising over
slavery—before he was assassinated.132

B.

A Well-Functioning Federal Government

In addition to the American conception of democracy as collective self-governance,
which other political communities may share, another foundation upon which to rest a
constitutional role morality for elected officials is more distinctly American. The United States
Constitution brought into being a robust system of separation of powers and checks and
balances. The Framers fashioned such a horizontal constitutional structure without anticipating
political parties, let alone the ideological parties in existence today but absent throughout most of
the twentieth century. That regime of separation of powers, which is often characterized by the

129

Eric Posner, Judges v. Trump: Be Careful What You Wish For, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/opinion/judges-v-trump-be-careful-what-you-wish-for.html?_r=1.
130

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448–49 (1789).

131

Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE (Nov. 19, 1863),
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm.
132

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s firm rejection of President Trump’s idea of eliminating the
filibuster as to legislation can potentially be understood as resting in part on a normative and anti-sheer-majoritarian
conception of the role of the Senate. See Aaron Blake, Mitch McConnell Just Rebuked Trump’s Suggestion to Nuke
the Filibuster. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/05/02/3-reasons-the-gop-wont-nuke-the-filibuster-and-give-trump-morepower/?utm_term=.374cdb0e4fa5. On the other hand, a less charitable interpretation is possible. See, e.g., Fred
Barnes, Mitch McConnell Goes to the Mattress for Trump’s Judicial Nominees, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Oct. 11,
2017),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/mitch-mcconnell-goes-to-the-mattresses-for-trumps-judicialnominees/article/2010022 (noting the various actions that Leader McConnell has taken to prevent Senate Democrats
from impeding the confirmation of President Trump’s judicial nominees, including the elimination of “blue slips,”
which in the past had allowed senators to bar a nominee from their state by refusing to return their slip to the Senate
Judicial Committee, thereby preventing a hearing and confirmation).

26

separation of parties in control of different parts of the government, 133 creates ample
opportunities for one political party, or a part of one party, to thwart potential action by the
federal government. Moreover, because the minority party in the Senate is empowered to
filibuster most legislation, the problem of potential paralysis endures in circumstances of unified
government. As a result, troubling questions arise regarding how the federal government is to
execute its basic responsibilities of filling executive and judicial offices, solving problems that
the states are not well-situated to address on their own (characteristically, multi-state collective
action problems), 134 and safeguarding rights through the passage and updating of civil rights
legislation (which several constitutional provisions authorize Congress to do).135 The separation
and interrelation of powers are supposed to cabin and qualify the exercise of the substantial set of
powers that the Constitution vests in the federal government. The separation is not supposed to
largely negate or neuter those powers.
Commentators who reject that understanding of the limited role of the separation of
powers in the constitutional scheme will likely reject the analysis that follows in this sub-Part.
Unfortunately, an attempt to fully defend the structural vision emphasized here would take this
Article too far afield. For present purposes, two points will have to suffice. First, the Framers of
1787 gathered in Philadelphia to substantially enhance federal power, not to restrict it.136 Given
the heated rhetoric about a federal leviathan that one often encounters, it bears emphasizing that
the perceived problem in the 1780s was that the national government under the Articles of
Confederation was way too weak, not that it was so strong that a complex institutional
architecture was needed to restrain it. 137 Second, and fast-forwarding to the present, most
Americans living today look to the federal government to actually exercise its powers in a
variety of ways, not to be consistently hamstrung in its ability to do so. There comes a point at
which the “checks and balances” theory of the horizontal constitutional structure malfunctions;
rather than acting to discourage ill-considered or excessive federal action, all the veto gates
produce hopeless gridlock and obstructionism.
One obvious response is to invoke the vertical constitutional structure—that is,
federalism. On that view, it is a good thing (or at least not a bad thing) if the federal government
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is incapable of taking effective action; the states can often act effectively, and federal inaction
leaves the states more room to maneuver. To understand why that position is ultimately
unpersuasive, it is important to recall the basic insight of collective action federalism.138 There
are many problems in today’s modern, integrated economy and society whose nature and scope
disrespect state borders, so that the states actually need the federal government to be able to step
in. Examples include military defense, anti-terrorism efforts, interstate markets, interstate
infrastructure, and environmental protection. Where collective action by states is required in
order for substantial progress to be made, having a strong, effective federal government
promotes rather than undermines state autonomy. Accordingly, if one examines the entire
American constitutional structure—not just the horizontal separation and interrelation of powers
at the federal level, but also the vertical separation of powers between the federal government
and the states—the most compelling conclusion is that all Americans, as well as state
governments themselves, are better served as a general matter by a federal government that can
act, and act effectively.139
There is another reason why the separation of powers and parties may at first glance seem
like only a feature and never a bug. If (as the previous sub-Part argued) governmental action that
is narrowly partisan can be a problem from the standpoint of collective self-governance, then
part of the solution is to impose consensus-forcing devices, and veto gates can serve that
function. No doubt, there is truth in that reasoning: a close relationship exists between, say, the
filibuster as to appointments or legislation and the facilitation of collective self-rule. The
difficulty is that facilitating collective self-governance is not the only responsibility of the federal
government. As noted, the political branches are also charged with accomplishing various tasks
associated with governance, from appointing officials to enacting legislation. And veto gates can
result in Congress accomplishing little, which has arguably been the case at the federal level too
often in recent years. For example, whatever one’s preferred solution to the problem of more
than eleven million undocumented people living to a significant extent in the shadows in the
United States, the federal government should also be addressing the issue through new
legislation, not just through unilateral action by the president (whether Obama or Trump).140
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To be sure, a number of heated political disagreements in America today are in part
precisely about how much action the federal government should be taking. As noted, however, it
also seems true that Americans of most ideological stripes want the federal government to be
able to act effectively, even if they sometimes disagree about the spheres or directions in which
such effective action should take place.141 (Demands for a robust federal response to the latest
natural disaster continuously bring that point home.) And the federal government cannot function
effectively if presidents or parties in control of Congress push to the legal limits their powers to,
for example, veto legislation, nominate aggressive partisans, decline to nominate people to fill
key positions, repeatedly filibuster executive or judicial branch nominees or legislation, and deny
confirmation hearings or votes (or not consider nominees at all).
Consider again, for example, the Senate’s handling of judicial nominations in recent
years.142 Because the Supreme Court is not like other courts, it is a serious problem if we have in
fact reached the point at which Supreme Court vacancies will go unfilled unless the same
political party controls the White House and the Senate. The Supreme Court plays a unique role
in ensuring uniformity on important questions of federal law, and an even number of Justices on
a closely divided Court impairs its ability to execute that responsibility. The Court ends up
granting fewer cases, splitting 4-4 on some of the cases it does agree to hear (thereby not
establishing a precedent), and deciding some cases very narrowly (thereby offering little
guidance) in order to avoid such splits. 143 Moreover, judges from other courts cannot sit by
designation in order to break ties, nor could visiting judges provide the kind of guidance and
stability that the legal system often requires.
That example illustrates the potential tension between the pursuit of collective selfgovernance and the pursuit of effective self-governance—of collective action. The question the
example raises is whether there are, or can be developed, normative constraints on elected
officials over and above strictly legal limits that can encourage officials to participate in the
political process with some self-restraint, and so refrain from pushing their powers to their
respective maxima. As the English Whig and Liberal politician (and future prime minister) Lord
John Russell wrote to Poulett Thomson in 1839 while the latter was Governor General of
Canada, “[e]very political constitution in which different bodies share the supreme power is only
enabled to exist by the forbearance of those among whom this power is distributed. . . . Each
must exercise a wise moderation.”144 Representatives disserve everyone, including Americans
who did vote for them, when they undermine the proper functioning of the constitutional system.
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Relevant in this regard is the political science literature suggesting that today’s elected officials
are disserving their constituents (including the people who voted for them) by pursuing policies
that are more extreme than what their constituents would want.145
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, insisted that there were normative constraints on
the political discretion of elected officials. President Washington asked him for a formal legal
opinion on the question of whether the Senate had the right to negative the grade of persons
appointed by the president to fill foreign missions. As my colleague H. Jefferson Powell
explains, “Eighteenth century international law and etiquette recognized an elaborate hierarchy
of diplomats.” 146 The “grade” was the place in the hierarchy that “a country accorded its
representative(s) to another state,” and it “was itself a substantive act in the conduct of foreign
relations.”147 After analyzing the question presented and concluding that the Senate lacked such
power, Jefferson considered the counterargument “that the Senate may, by continual negatives
on the person, do what amounts to a negative on the grade; and so indirectly defeat this right of
the President.”148 Jefferson’s answer was that “this would be a breach of trust, an abuse of the
power confided to the Senate, of which that body cannot be supposed capable.” 149 “If the
Constitution had meant to give the Senate a negative on the grade or destination, as well as the
person,” Jefferson reasoned, “it would have said so in direct terms, and not left it to be effected
by a sidewind.”150 He concluded: “It could never mean to give them the use of one power thro
the abuse of another.”151 Particularly in current, polarized times, it is not difficult to dismiss as
hopelessly naïve Jefferson’s invocation “a breach of trust, an abuse of power confided to the
Senate.” But it may be especially important in such times to resist reaching for the cynical acid.
A constitutional role morality for elected officials can be based in part upon the
normative desirability of keeping partisanship within reasonable bounds so that the federal
government can function more effectively and with greater stability—so that there is more
bipartisan action by the federal government, as opposed to opposition-forced inaction or
narrowly partisan action (often accompanied by a disreputable policymaking process) in order to
overcome the opposition. A role morality for elected officials, while not in the Constitution, is
deeply connected to the Constitution because law alone is not enough to sustain the American
constitutional project. Disregarding the role expectations that pertain to elective office is not
simply bad politics or policy, but constitutes a deviation from norms of good institutional
citizenship that help the constitutional system endure. Such a suggestion may seem naïve, just as
Jefferson’s assessment of the question posed to him by President Washington may seem naïve.
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But it is also possible that many contemporary elected officials have lost their way and should be
encouraged to find their way back. The same should be said of the donors, party officials,
advocacy groups, media outlets, and constituents who constitute the environment in which
elected officials must function.

III.

THE CONTENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE MORALITY

What should a role morality for elected officials of the federal government look like?
How does it differ from governmental paralysis? This Part fleshes out those questions and offers
preliminary answers. The first sub-Part defines the problem and explains why it would be
advisable to temper expectations regarding the articulation of solutions. The second sub-Part
offers potential candidates for inclusion in a constitutional role morality.
In order to make some progress on what is a profoundly difficult set of issues, this Part—
like the Article more generally—will engage in abstraction by discussing federal elected officials
as a general class of actors, at least for the most part. In reality, however, presidents may be
differently situated from members of Congress in certain respects; for example, presidents are
the leaders of their political party. Similar observations could be made of judges; for example,
the role expectations of Supreme Court Justices may differ in significant ways from those of
lower federal court judges.152 Yet it is still commonplace and useful for certain purposes to talk
of judicial role morality in general. Because the question of whether a role morality applies to
presidents and members of Congress at all is so under-explored among constitutional law
scholars in the United States, it seems appropriate to lump federal elected officials together at
this preliminary stage. There will be time enough to split them apart.153

A.

The Problem

Grounding role expectations for federal elected officials in (1) the normative ideal of
democracy as collective self-governance and (2) a well-functioning federal government implies
that electoral winners owe something both to their political opponents, to the nation as a whole,
and to the institutions in which they serve. But what do they owe? It cannot be correct in
principle that moderation and compromise are always the proper course of action. And if
supermajority support were required before elected officials could act, too little worth doing by
the federal government would be accomplished in a polarized society. To put the point
hyperbolically (as it has been put to me), winning an election cannot mean that you never really
win, and losing cannot mean that you never really lose. Elections do have significant
consequences, and the winners are entitled to act like it.
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And so, the problem of what elected officials owe their opponents, nation, and
institutions defies easy solutions. Before sketching some potential answers, three observations
seem warranted. First, the question of what role morality demands of judges is also quite
challenging. Yet because of what has been perceived to be at stake, the difficulty of the task has
not dissuaded generations of constitutional law scholars, and even judges themselves, from
attending to the problem. The same posture seems appropriate in the case of elected officials.
Second, this Article has relatively modest expectations. It will have succeeded to the
extent that readers are far enough along in considering its argument to be moved to ask what role
expectations for politicians should look like. The dominant discourse in American constitutional
law and politics, including in most of the law review literature, assumes or asserts that there are
no principled restraints on elected officials other than legality.
Third, it is important to have modest expectations in considering potential answers to the
question of what role restraints should look like. Again, it is a terribly difficult question, and it
has yet to be much analyzed by academic constitutional lawyers in the United States. As in the
cases of theories of morality, political theories of representation, professional ethics in applicable
fields, and role morality in the judicial realm, answers are likely to be contestable and
contested,154 and to illuminate the question not just by revealing truth but also by exemplifying
error. The most that can probably be hoped for, at least at this point, is to offer perspectives and
starting points for critical assessment and further inquiry.

B.

A Sketch of a Role Morality for Federal Elected Officials

A vision of the constitutional role morality that attaches to federal elective office can be
developed along at least three dimensions: the rhetorical, the procedural, and the substantive.
Each is discussed below, in increasing order of difficulty. The distinction between procedure and
substance, although a generally useful one, can be as challenging to draw on the edges in this
context as in others. There is room for disagreement about the placement of certain
considerations articulated below in one category or another.155
One of the first obligations that a constitutional role morality would likely impose on
federal elected officials—the president above all others, but members of Congress as well—is to
seek ways of reaching out rhetorically to Americans who voted against them. (In that regard,
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address, discussed above, is a model.156) Moreover, a role morality
would counsel officials to continue reaching out rhetorically throughout their time in
office. Under no circumstances would a role morality advise elected officials to gratuitously
alienate non-supporters by, for example, calling them names or mocking their identities or way
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of life. Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton likely fell short in this regard when she said at a
fundraiser that “you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of
deplorables.”157
A qualification is immediately in order. The feeling and expression of political sympathy
and inclusion, even as a theoretical matter, may be (and certainly is in fact) conditional rather
than unconditional. Accordingly, the rhetorical reaching out suggested above would need to
know some bounds. It should likely be limited to Americans whose commitments and conduct
fall within a broad, but not limitless, range of reasonable disagreement.158 Although the bounds
of reasonableness will be contestable and contested (especially given the degrees of polarization
and ill will that characterize contemporary American politics), there are at least some consensus
candidates for exclusion from the universe of rhetorical concern. White supremacists, neo-Nazis,
and terrorists come immediately to mind.
Even qualifying the claim in the way described above, an obvious response is that such
sympathetic talk amounts to mere gestures, mere matters of appearance. It is primarily about
appearances, but that observation counts against the proposal only on a cynical premise of
disingenuousness that is rejected by the whole project of developing a constitutional role
morality. As Justice O’Connor wrote in a different context (namely, the intersection of race and
electoral design), “appearances do matter.” 159 Americans will put up with a good deal of
disappointment if they feel that they matter—that they are being respected and heard by elected
officials even if the answer is “no.”160 A role morality for elected officials in the United States
should likely reflect the idea that those who govern have a duty to make all of us feel that we are
within the political community for whose welfare they are concerned.
It is easy to underestimate the significance of rhetoric. The reason politicians use rhetoric
is that it can shape people’s perceptions and commitments. A strengthened rhetoric of inclusion
and equal concern is likely to shape reality in positive directions. Consider, in that regard, the
social value of driving overt racism (almost) out of the public sphere—and of resisting its
reintroduction. The shift in recent decades away from anti-LGBTQ rhetoric in the public sphere
is another example of the power of rhetoric to change social attitudes.161
Procedurally, several promising possibilities are worth considering for inclusion in the
role expectations of elected officials. Informing those possibilities is the insight of dialogic
theorists of democracy, discussed above, that a procedural approach is the most feasible way to
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reconcile democracy and diversity.162 A procedural approach may also be a promising way to
reconcile the entitlement of electoral winners to act on their promises to supporters with the other
potential responsibilities discussed immediately below.
First, moving beyond rhetorical outreach, elected officials should have a responsibility to
take seriously the concerns of non-supporters, the best interests of the nation, and the long-term
health of their institutions by considering each of them in good faith. There ought to be some
obligation to balance one’s partisan and electoral interests against the interests of political
opponents, the nation as a whole, and the institution in which one serves. Of course, this does not
mean that politicians should not pursue their partisan and electoral interests. For example, a
president ought to have due regard for the future of the political party that he or she leads; the
party constitutes the primary institutional means of continuing his or her policies after leaving
office. The modest suggestion here is only that politicians should not exclusively consider
partisan and electoral interests.
Second, electoral winners should, at least as a general matter, have a duty to consult with
opposition leaders before making important decisions or taking significant actions. In addition to
building trust and facilitating cooperation, consultation is an important way to ensure that one’s
beliefs about political issues are epistemically responsible, meaning that they are formed and
maintained without being distorted by ideology, wishful thinking, framing effects, confirmation
bias, etc.163 A failure to consult is part of what we have seen in the political branches in recent
years in the area of judicial nominations.164 As a result, both collective self-governance and the
effective functioning of the federal government have arguably suffered.
Third, electoral winners should have an obligation to deliberate in good faith with
opposition leaders when considering whether to take important actions. This does not mean that
electoral winners should not ultimately act on their agendas. It does mean, however, that they
should ordinarily not act before first attempting to enlist the support of, and then negotiate with,
the other side. That is a more demanding obligation than the aforementioned proposals to
consider and consult.
Another qualification is warranted. The above proposals to “reach out,” “take seriously,”
“consult,” “deliberate,” and keep doing so throughout one’s term in office raise obvious concerns
about opportunity cost and futility. Life is short, time in elective office is even shorter, and
unless the reaching out is relatively casual, elected officials may not have enough time and
energy to keep at it, especially with respect to the ideological fringes of each party in
Congress. How much reaching out, to whom, and for how long are not questions that can be
answered theoretically; they require exercise of the human faculty of judgment in particular
situations as they arise. The most that can be said theoretically is that elected officials will need
to trade off the rhetorical and procedural values described above with the vindication of other
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important values, including those associated with the successful passage of legislation and
effective governance more generally.
Substantively, the contents of a constitutional role morality should likely include general
compliance with established political norms that advance constitutional purposes.165 To be sure,
norms are “inherently provisional; they simultaneously settle presidential duty for a time and
orient contestation over what acceptable behavior should be.” 166 The same could be said of
congressional norms. But surely certain norms are so well-established and serve such vital
constitutional functions that a politician would require special justification to flout them. For
example, routine lying by elected officials alienates the political opposition and makes political
cooperation very difficult. Moreover, the obligation of elected officials to avoid some norm
violations likely trumps the desire or duty to stay in office. The fact that norms are in the way
does not furnish justification for violating them. They are supposed to be in the way.
The contents of a role morality should also likely include general compliance with
“constitutional conventions” in the British (and, more generally, Commonwealth) sense of that
term. As Keith Whittington has explained, constitutional conventions may be understood “as
maxims, beliefs, and principles that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”167
Derived in substantial part from the historical practices of governmental institutions, they are
non-legal in status but are experienced as obligatory.168 Unlike political conventions generally,
moreover, constitutional conventions advance a purpose of the constitution. In the United States,
such purposes include facilitating democratic self-government (as discussed above),169 creating
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an effective federal government (also discussed above), protecting judicial independence,170 and
preventing the corruption of federal criminal law enforcement. 171 To act contrary to a
constitutional convention, as Whittington observes, “is to violate the spirit of the constitution,
even if it does not violate any particular rule.” 172 The same could be said of disregarding
constitutional role morality more generally.
A key advantage of deriving the substantive content of constitutional role morality in part
from political norms and constitutional conventions is that it renders the normative inquiry
analytically more tractable. Collective self-governance and an effective federal government help
explain why role restraints are essential, but they are obviously abstract constitutional purposes.
By contrast, the historical norms and practices of governmental institutions—and their
procedural rules as well—can offer more determinate normative guidance. Their existence
enables inductive, granular inquiries into the restraints that politicians have already developed
for themselves over relatively long periods of time. They can be mined for normative guidance
regarding the proper role of elected officials in the American system of government.173
Yet another qualification is required. Sometimes it may be necessary for presidents and
members of Congress to violate even important norms and conventions.174 The great classics in
the literature on political role morality (as a genre) have frequently taken the position that the
morality of private life does not work in public life—that there is a disconnect between ordinary
morality and political morality. The general thrust of this literature is that the stakes are so high
in politics that the nicety of ordinary moral rules need to give way. On this view, consequences
matter substantially more in the public realm than in the private realm because political decisions
determine, for example, whether large numbers of people live or die, whether wars and economic
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depressions begin or end, and whether demagogues come to power or are defeated.175 While this
view can easily be overstated or misused to rationalize troubling behavior by politicians, there is
no doubt truth in the conviction that sometimes the stakes are so high in politics that even
venerable norms and conventions must give way.
More controversially, federal politicians may bear some responsibility to practice
moderation and compromise, at least presumptively. 176 That responsibility may include some
obligation not to take everything that they can get away with taking in an interaction with other
politicians.177 Such self-restraint would likely require elected officials to adopt a longer-term
institutional perspective and to possess a certain amount of respect for Americans on the other
side of the issue under consideration.178 Cashing out substantive role expectations in that way
can help maintain a meaningful level of social solidarity and cohesion. It can also help the
federal government function more effectively and with greater stability. In a deeply polarized
society, perhaps political steps should ordinarily be smaller in length and more cautious in
placement.179
To be plausible, however, a presumption in favor of moderation and compromise would
have to be rebuttable and responsive to the extant conditions of political life. There have been
times in American history when proposed forms of immoderacy and stridency were themselves
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arguably justifiable. Reconstruction may be a good example. 180 The New Deal may be
another. The Civil Rights Era may be a third. There are issues, especially moral ones involving
basic human dignity or equality guarantees or economic security, regarding which a president or
member of Congress may not be able to compromise and must simply and entirely disappoint
Americans on the other side.
One might go further and argue that immoderacy and stridency are always justifiable for
the have-nots, precisely because tacit norms in the United States construct demands for justice as
immoderacy and stridency. On that view, the lesson of past mobilizations is that norms of civility
are just so much window dressing for status hierarchies. The claim is worth taking seriously, but
it does not counsel rejecting the idea of a constitutional role morality for elected officials.
As an initial matter, the norms and conventions that apply to government officials may be
different from the ones that apply to social movements and private activists. For example, it is at
least plausible to think that movement activists, who do not represent their agonists or the nation
as a whole, are justified in pushing harder for social change than most elected officials should be
willing to push at a given point in time. Even assuming otherwise, not every past mobilization
has succeeded only through immoderacy and stridency. For example, both the Civil Rights
Movement and Second-Wave feminism involved a good deal of strategic incrementalism,
compromise, and appeals to Americans on the other side of the issue in question.181 In addition,
it is not clear why immoderacy and stridency are characteristically more likely to help
traditionally excluded groups persuade Americans who possess power to take their claims
seriously; immoderacy and stridency can also cause people of good will to recoil. Finally, this
Article illustrates that norms of civility and related norms are not simply window dressing for
status hierarchies. They also help make it possible for people with very different worldviews to
go on living together by working out their conflicts without resorting to violence.182
That said, another, related caveat regarding compromise is warranted. It is critical for
elected officials to bear in mind who is not in the room when compromises are hashed out.183
There are well-known instances in American history in which political compromises came at the
expense of people who lacked economic and political power. For example, the celebrated
historian G. Van Woodward described the plight of African Americans in the South after
Reconstruction ended pursuant to a political compromise between Southern Democrats and the
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Republican Party.184 “The determination of the Negro’s ‘place’ took shape gradually,” he wrote,
“under the influence of economic and political conflicts among divided white people—conflicts
that were eventually resolved in part at the expense of the Negro.”185 In current times, potential
compromises over gun control risk trading in false and damaging stereotypes about disabled
Americans. 186 Elected officials should always be alert to the possibility that proposed
compromises reflect or reinforce the inferior social status of historically excluded groups in
American society.187
Again, when to compromise and when to refuse is not a theoretical question; answering it
in particular contexts requires political judgment. But much of the time on important policy
issues, the above risks do not predominate and there are multiple, cross-cutting concerns, not all
of which fracture Americans into two diametrically opposed camps. Alternatively, there is a
broad level of agreement on the existence of a problem but sharp disagreement about how best
to address it. In such circumstances, moderation and compromise are possible. It is often partisan
identity and an aversion in principle to compromise that get in the way.
One final qualification is needed, and it is an important one. In developing a
constitutional role morality for elected officials of the federal government, a persistent problem
lies in balancing words like “modest,” “experimental,” and “pragmatic” with the possibility of a
dramatic political shift that is legitimated by a special democratic warrant to act. Bruce
Ackerman’s influential theory of constitutional moments is built around the possibility of
supermajorities, over sustained periods of time, with clear statements of objectives and
stakes.188 Whether Ackerman is right or wrong about the grounds of legitimate constitutional
change, he is surely right that strong, sustained supermajority support is relevant to politically
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appropriate change—and therefore, to how restraining a role morality for elected officials should
be at a particular point in political time. But radical and dramatic change is the exception in
American politics, not the rule. And the circumstances of American politics today approach the
antithesis of the circumstances that Ackerman describes as licensing radical change.

C.

What about the Affordable Care Act?

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was the most significant
legislative legacy of Democratic President Barack Obama.189 A Democratic Congress passed the
statute over vehement Republican opposition, 190 and without a single Republican vote, 191
notwithstanding the fact that it was the most significant expansion of the social safety net in the
United States in almost half a century. 192 In addition, congressional Democrats ultimately
resorted to an unconventional legislative process in order to enact the law.193 According to public
opinion polls, moreover, popular majorities opposed the statute for years, and the ACA achieved
majority support in the nation only recently, as it was being threatened with repeal by a
Republican president and Congress.194 Most Americans continue to believe that parts of the law
189
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should be repealed (while other parts should be kept).195 Given all of those considerations, how
could it have been consistent with the constitutional role morality just sketched for Democratic
politicians to have passed the ACA? If a role morality for elected officials has any bite at all,
then should it not have counseled against passage of that law?
Those are fair questions, and they deserve an answer, particularly from a scholar who
devoted much time to defending the constitutionality of the law.196 But the importance of the
questions far transcends the continued controversy surrounding the ACA. A more general way to
frame the issue is whether widespread adoption of a constitutional role morality for elected
officials would rule out major, controversial actions by the federal government. If elected
officials acted the way this Article would have them act, could Congress still pass a statute like
the ACA? If so, would it need to follow a different process from the one the ACA Congress
followed?
Although reasonable minds will differ about what constitutional role morality required of
Democratic politicians given the considerations described above, the most persuasive answer (in
this author’s view) is not what is implied by the selective arrangement of the facts previously
noted. The ACA was not a partisan innovation or bolt from the blue; on the contrary, it was the
culmination of many decades of failed attempts at bipartisan health care reform.197 Moreover, the
White House and Democratic leaders made efforts to reach out to Republican members of
Congress rhetorically and procedurally, and Democrats incorporated some of the Republicans’
past and present substantive ideas. 198 In addition, Democratic leaders held numerous public
hearings, developed an extensive legislative record, and voted after the Congressional Budget
Office scored the various bills. In the end, the process entailed more than a year of legislative
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effort and public scrutiny.199 The procedural shortcuts for which Democrats deserve blame in
passing the ACA pale in comparison to how Republicans have since repeatedly proceeded in
attempting to repeal and replace the law.200 And because substance matters too in assessing what
role morality requires of politicians in particular circumstances, it is also relevant that the statute
seeks to address what is fairly described as a human tragedy and serious economic problem: tens
of millions of Americans who lack health insurance and thus access to basic, affordable health
care.201
There is more. Parts of the law have always been popular (namely, the provisions that
protect people from being denied coverage based on pre-existing conditions or charged higher
premiums based on medical history), and those parts are tied functionally to the provision of the
law that was probably least popular (the so-called individual mandate). 202 Those facts may
suggest that much of the public did not understand how the statute was designed to work. Even
now, unified Republican government has resulted in repeated failures to repeal the law, 203
although the individual mandate was repealed by the recently enacted tax law.204 To reiterate,
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there were key parts of the ACA’s drafting process that left much to be desired,205 but others did
not and, overall, it does not seem an abuse of political power for the Democrats to have
eventually decided to go it alone. After decades of failure and unwavering Republican opposition
at the time, it would likely have been asking too much of the Democrats to wait another decade
or more to achieve their objective of helping the uninsured. A constitutional role morality is not
infinitely constraining, but that does not mean it is not constraining at all.
Other commentators will no doubt disagree with the above analysis. Dissensus will likely
be attributable in part—but only in part—to substantive disagreements about the wisdom or
constitutionality of the ACA. Just as questions of judicial role generate robust disagreements,206
so will issues of political role if the idea of a constitutional role morality takes hold. Such
disagreements are, to a substantial extent, healthy—far healthier than simply assuming or
asserting the absence of a constitutional role morality applicable to elected officials.
Disagreement generates dialogue, and dialogue helps fashion and fortify the very role restraints
whose applicability is at issue.207
To be sure, disagreement is not only healthy. The risk is that a common commitment to
the idea of a constitutional role morality will end up recapitulating the very partisan conflicts it is
attempting to temper.208 It may be unduly pessimistic, however, to conclude that such a common
commitment would be both genuine and completely unrestraining. Forcing politicians to justify
their conduct in terms of constitutional role morality—in terms of due regard for the political
opposition, the nation as a whole, and the institutions in which they serve—would itself be an
improvement over the status quo. As discussed above,209 rhetoric helps shape reality, and in any
event, requiring such justificatory rhetoric would help “smoke out” excessively partisan
purposes. Just as Republicans condemned parts of the process through which the ACA was
enacted, so Democrats are currently demanding public-spirited justifications from Republicans.
And Republicans may again be asking the same of Democrats after the 2018 and 2020 elections.
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IV.

ROLE ALLOCATIONS

Constitutional law scholarship that further develops a role morality for elected officials
will have implications for how different actors in the American constitutional system should
execute their professional responsibilities if they are to make it more likely that such a role
morality will eventually be embraced and sustained. This Part examines those implications and
actors. In addition to politicians themselves, they include citizens broadly, school teachers, law
teachers, and Americans who oppose aggressive action by a presidential administration or
Congress.

A.

Elected Officials and Citizens

The challenge for elected officials is to consider not just the legal authority that they
possess as a result of formal electoral processes, but also the political authority that they can
acquire only from reaching out to a broader range of Americans than their political base. Just as
non-legal but presumptively obligatory norms of the system may require judges to moderate in
various ways, so elected officials should come to respect a role morality something like the one
sketched in Part III. Of course, such norm internalization by politicians is unlikely in the shortto-medium run. For example, no one should expect President Trump, senior members of his
administration, or congressional Republicans to be much moved by arguments that they are
obliged to moderate. One should expect some Republicans and Democrats up for re-election in
2018 or 2020 who do not occupy safe seats to conclude that it is in their political self-interest to
moderate with respect to some issues. But the pursuit of political self-interest is not the same
phenomenon as the internalization of a political norm.210
Given the short-to-medium term prospects for success, arguments of the sort being
tendered in this Article are easily dismissed as being suggested by electoral losers and ignored by
elector winners. Yet such arguments may also fall on deaf ears in the case of assertive jurists.
Even so, it is worth repeating the point of Part I: generations of constitutional law scholars, law
teachers, and other participants in American constitutional discourse have made such arguments
to judges all the while knowing that many judges, including pivotal Justices, may be unwilling to
heed them. The hope seems to have been that in general, over the long run, and at certain key
moments, such arguments may make an important difference.211 It does not seem entirely fair to
dismiss as electoral losers legal scholars and others who “hold onto a set of expectations for
lawyers, politicians, judges, or legal scholars like themselves, even in the face of evidence that
those expectations frequently and repeatedly go unmet.”212 Relatedly, it does not seem accurate
210
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to charge this Article with making inconsistent assumptions about what motivates government
officials.213 The Article is arguing that more public-regarding and institution-minded motivations
from elected officials would better sustain the constitutional system. It is hardly assuming that
elected officials will be so motivated any time soon just because it would be valuable for them to
be so motivated.
In order to eventually instill such normative expectations in politicians, it is essential to
also try instilling them in their constituents (not to mention the donors, party officials, media
outlets, and others who constitute the environment in which elected officials must function).
How to do so is beyond this author’s expertise and the sphere of influence of constitutional law
scholars more generally. That said, enhancing civic education for young Americans (contrary to
current trends) seems like a good idea, as important as STEM fields also are, and as naïve as the
suggestion may sound.214 Imagine teaching the next several generations of schoolchildren that
voters, like elected officials, soldiers, and jurors, hold an important public office, and that as
trustees, they are “charged with the responsibility of acting on behalf of society as a whole,
present and future.” 215 Figuring out ways to reach the broader public and other players who
surround elected officials would, among other virtues, afford politicians some normative “space”
in which to function in a more public-regarding and institution-minded way.

B.

Law Teachers

If politicians are going to learn such lessons over the longer run, then others are going to
have to teach them when they are younger and more impressionable. A noble charge for law
teachers, including constitutional law teachers, would be for them to develop ideas, curricula,
and methods aimed at instructing future political leaders—not just future judges—that a
constitutional role morality applies to them.216 More generally, law teachers might impress upon
their students the point that federal judges and elected officials are not only different (although
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they are); they are also, in certain key respects, more similar than has traditionally been thought
by constitutional law scholars. Both sets of actors possess, or should possess, role restraints on
their pursuit of substantive objectives. And in both realms, fundamental questions arise about
how it is appropriate to use the power one possesses in the face of broad and deep disagreement.
Law teachers could also engage their students as citizens, not just future lawyers and political
leaders, and instruct them that high levels of polarization and animus between members of the
two main political parties imperil the constitutional system.
This Article has examined the role responsibilities of presidents and members of
Congress by asking into the relationship between various kinds of restraints on partisanship and
the accomplishment of vital constitutional purposes. There are, of course, other ways to theorize
and teach about the role restraints, or lack thereof, that attach to political office. As discussed
above, the great classics of political morality have tended to argue that the stakes are so high in
politics that ordinary morality must give way.217 By contrast, Arthur Applbaum, in his seminal
book on role morality, argues that political, legal, and business “[i]nstitutions and the roles they
create ordinarily cannot mint moral permissions to do what otherwise would be morally
prohibited.”218
Scholars of the legal profession are also focused on issues of role morality. For example,
W. Bradley Wendel describes truthfulness in public life as “an ethical ideal,” and he argues that
“[s]eeking to learn the truth and communicate it accurately to other people are virtues that are
necessary to a common form of life characterized by trust, respect, and the protection of human
dignity”219 Moreover, there is an important sub-debate in the literature about the role morality of
government lawyers. During the Bush administration, for example, there was much thinking
about their role morality, especially in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.220
In addition to work on role morality, writing on leadership is pertinent to scholarship and
teaching that means to educate future politicians during their time in law school. There have
traditionally been many ideas about, and accounts of, leadership in such disciplines as law,
sociology, and history.221 There is also much modern research on leadership in a number of
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fields.222 Academic research on leadership may sit in fascinating tension with the basic insight
that “[c]ontext is everything” in determining what leadership requires in a particular situation.223
Also relevant are potential historical exemplars of leadership or its antithesis in politics,
both in the United States and in other democracies.224 Those exemplars could be developed as
case studies, in much the way that certain judicial biographies and judicial decisions serve as
case studies of success or failure in fulfilling the responsibilities of the judicial role. 225 The
discussions of Burke, Madison, Washington, and Jefferson in this Article, which draw upon the
views of some of the most widely respected and venerable political figures from the American
Founding (if one is not examining issues of race or gender), can be understood as gestures in a
profitable direction. And there are no doubt numerous “contra” examples from different
historical eras that could be analyzed. There is room for such discussions in constitutional law
classes, particular if the professor emphasizes the role of constitutional interpretation and
leadership outside the courts. For example, one leading casebook includes excerpts of historic
addresses or writings by Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, Jacob Howard, Susan B.
Anthony, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Jr., John F. Kennedy, Hubert H.
Humphrey, Everett McKinley Dirksen, and Lyndon B. Johnson, among others.226
So as not to become discouraged, law professors (as well as other academics and nonacademics) who accept this invitation will have to keep their expectations relatively modest, at
least in the short-to-medium run. Legal academics have greater influence over judges than they
do over legislators and executive officials, for at least two reasons. First, all judges, but only
some legislators and executive officials, are lawyers. Second, notwithstanding complaints by
Chief Justice John Roberts, D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards, and some other judges about the
uselessness of law review articles to judges,227 many judges (including in all likelihood the Chief
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Justice) in fact consult at least some of the law review literature.228 More generally, judges care
about maintaining a good relationship with the legal academy for reasons that may not apply as
readily to members of the elected branches. Those reasons include shared intellectual interests
and the fact that the law schools supply law clerks.
Still, law schools could develop a more robust relationship with the political branches by
reconceptualizing them in the way this Article proposes, even if that relationship would still not
be as close as it is with the judiciary any time soon. Law schools could also cultivate a closer
relationship with the political branches by developing more of a practice of sending their
graduates to serve members of Congress and executive branch officials, in addition to judges.
For example, a step in the right direction would be passage of the Congressional Clerkship Act,
which would create a congressional version of the federal judicial clerkship program. Proponents
of the Congressional Clerkship Act seek to address the general lack of legislative work
experience among members of the legal profession and to help bridge the divide between the
legislative and judicial branches.229 Were members of Congress to take it seriously as a way of
accessing young legal talent, a congressional clerkship program would also have the virtue of
developing closer ties between the legal academy and Congress.

C.

The Opposition

Finally, the vision offered in this Article has implications for practices of political
resistance. Few engaged participants in the constitutional system would be persuaded to accept
aggressive judicial behavior based only on such statements as “appointments have
consequences” or “it’s just judging” for federal judges to strongly advance ideological agendas.
Likewise, it is not clear why opposition politicians, members of the news media, the institutions
of civil society, and concerned citizens should accept as conversation stoppers assertions by
those in political power or their defenders that “elections have consequences” or “it’s just
politics” for politicians to forcefully advance ideological agendas. They should instead regard
themselves as entitled to vigorously contest the constitutional legitimacy of exercises of partisan
political power when elected officials seek to justify acting in narrowly partisan ways by
invoking the outcome of the previous election.
The closest one observes to such pushback in contemporary political discourse can be
found in debates over whether a new president is “legitimate” or has a “mandate” to govern.
Debates over whether a particular president is “legitimate,” however, often miss the distinction
between legal legitimacy and what this Article terms constitutional legitimacy. Legal legitimacy
for a president inheres in winning a sufficient number of votes in the Electoral College.
Constitutional legitimacy, it is worth repeating, cannot be earned by winning only bare majority
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support, let alone minority support, throughout the nation for the lion’s share of one’s policies,
priorities, and conduct in office. As for whether a new president has a “mandate” to govern, that
is one good question to ask because the existence of a mandate can be interpreted as implying a
certain level of inclusivity beyond bare majority support. But even the existence of a genuine
electoral mandate (an unlikely phenomenon in current times) should not free elected officials to
ignore their political opponents or the best interests of the institutions in which they serve.
Fully appreciating that a constitutional role morality applies to elected officials holds the
potential to catalyze—and to legitimate—practices of robust, confident political resistance. Role
restraints on presidents and members of Congress can serve as a constitutional anchor point for
the full-throated expression of such resistance and would help inspire Americans not to relent
when they are advised that “elections have consequences.” Elections do have consequences, but
those consequences may in particular instances not be what those who utter that statement mean
to imply. Rather than stopping a conversation about the exercise of political will, the idea that
elections have consequences should invite a conversation about what, exactly, the previous
election has settled—and what it has not.

V.

OBJECTIONS

This Part anticipates two objections to this Article’s project. The first is that
constitutional law scholars should not focus on developing a constitutional role morality for
elected officials, but should instead work on redesigning the institutional environments within
which politicians operate. The second objection, already anticipated in Part IV.A, is that the
vision set forth in this Article faces severe implementation problems.

A.

First Objection: Institutional Structure, Not Role Morality

This Article may be faulted for focusing on the development of role restraints of
questionable enforceability, and not on the redesign of the institutional environments within
which elected officials operate. Policing partisan gerrymanders, for example, would obviously
change the incentives of many members of the House of Representatives.230 And there are a
variety of new laws that a future Congress could pass, and a future president could sign into law,
that would enshrine various role restraints into law—for example, statutes requiring presidential
candidates to release their tax returns and divest of their business holdings. On the state level,
open primaries would combat partisan extremism. Why emphasize an ineffective role morality
instead of a more effective set of rules and structural reforms?
The most important response to this objection is that the two approaches are not mutually
exclusive. Role restraints should be viewed as a complement to, not a substitute for, work that
proposes new rules and a reconfiguration of governmental institutions. Given the magnitude of
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the self-governance and collective action problems facing the nation, a both-and approach is
preferable anyway to focusing exclusively on one or the other. The two approaches are also
related in that politicians who have, to some degree, internalized a role morality of the sort
championed in this Article are most likely to support public-spirited rules and structural reforms.
James Madison may have been right in Federalist 51 to emphasize institutional architecture first
and role restraints second,231 but it may be worth repeating that he placed significant value on
both.232 Notwithstanding statements like those in Federalist 51 that “[a]mbition must be made to
counteract ambition” and “[t]he interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional
rights of the place,”233 Madison did not believe that it would suffice for elected representatives to
possess little or no virtue or regard for the public good. Nor should Americans so believe today.
Another response is that rules and structures by themselves are very unlikely to succeed
without elected officials who are, to some non-trivial extent, properly normalized into a role.
There are just too many ways of successfully violating or circumventing rules and structures or
of behaving badly within the zones of discretion that they sensibly confer in order to enable
adaptation to unforeseeable circumstances. As legal scholar Justin Levitt writes, “[s]ubstantive
rules and institutional structure alone are insufficient to constrain certain forms of partisanship in
theory, or to explain their absence in practice. It takes more than zoning permission and a good
architect to make a house a home.”234 Imagine trying to run a law school or a political science
department, which depends heavily for its success on a widespread willingness to do institutional
work and participate in the intellectual life of the institution, with a faculty and staff that
responds only to rules, structures, and perceptions of political or financial costs and benefits.
To the extent the objection under consideration is actually focused on the relative realism
of institutional structure and role morality and not on their relative efficacy, a final response is
that it does not seem fair to criticize role restraints as unrealistic and then turn around and
propose structural reforms that may themselves be unrealistic. Because the institutional
environment is relatively fixed for the foreseeable future, at least as a general matter, Americans
living today are not well situated to think as constitutional framers do. The U.S. Constitution is
extraordinarily difficult to amend, whether through the traditional method (initial proposal by
two-thirds of each House of Congress), or through the method that has never before been used (a
convention of the fifty states called for by two-thirds of the state legislatures).235 Either way, it
requires only thirteen states to defeat a proposed amendment, and it is very likely that at least
thirteen states will reject proposals that are controversial, such as the balanced budget
amendment touted by conservative advocacy groups that in recent years have been pursuing a
convention of the states.236
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That said, some important rules and practices (like the filibuster and regular order237) are
sub-constitutional and do not even require legislation in order to preserve, re-introduce, or
terminate. Other problems, including partisan gerrymanders, may be ameliorated through
legislation, referenda, or judicial decisions. Again, it is worthwhile to propose and pursue
structural changes that would enhance collective self-governance and collective action, including
changes that do not seem likely to take place any time soon. But it is hard to see how developing
a constitutional role morality alongside structural proposals would make such changes less, as
opposed to more, likely to occur.

B.

Second Objection: Implementation

A second, related objection is that the vision offered in this Article faces daunting
implementation questions. What incentives do elected officials have to moderate their behavior
beyond legality? In an age of hyper-partisanship, do not the bases and donors of the two main
political parties pressure elected officials not to moderate, and are not federal judges more
insulated from such political pressure? Even worse, to the extent political scientists are correct
that the two parties are asymmetrically polarized, 238 this Article’s call for practices of
moderation, compromise, mutual respect, and restraint risks being dismissed by one side of the
ideological and partisan divide as itself ideological and partisan.239
Part IV initiated a conversation about some of those questions: it is important to
challenge legal academics to develop a constitutional role morality for elected officials; to
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challenge the public to expect their elected representatives to comply with one; to challenge
politicians to live it out; to devote greater, not fewer, resources to civic education; and to stop
teaching that politics is a realm in which people get to do pretty much whatever they want within
the bounds of the law. But this Article cannot adequately answer questions about
implementation. As noted at the outset, solutions to the problem of political polarization and ill
will obviously depend upon their causes.240 Because this Article has not examined those causes,
it has not proposed any short-to-medium-term solutions beyond efforts at education, which may
help whatever the primary causes. The Article has instead offered a normative account of the role
responsibilities of presidents and members of Congress that, if embraced by politicians and
others, would help sustain the constitutional project. The account offered here can be discussed
and debated on its own terms—that is, independent of concerns about implementation.
Another implementation problem concerns the strategic environment in which elected
officials must act. Even if a politician were persuaded by the account offered here, she could
reasonably ask why her “side” of the political aisle should “disarm” without knowing whether
the other side would follow suit. There is obviously a collective action problem, and unilateral
disarmament is unlikely to prove a good strategy.241 A role morality approach works only if it is
relatively reciprocal; otherwise, those who adopt it risk being “suckers.”242
That said, several observations are warranted. First, even when acting on a “tit for tat”
strategy, there is a potentially important difference between doing so with enthusiasm and doing
so with regret. The latter orientation might inspire public expressions of the conviction that a
race to the top would be better for all involved than a race to the bottom but that one has no
reasonable choice but to respond in kind as a way of punishing the other side’s excessive
partisanship.243
Second, there is a difference between (1) “tit for tat” responses to bad behavior from the
other side as a means of sticking up for one’s substantive interests and potentially securing better
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behavior in the future, and (2) responses that escalate a conflict, thereby hastening a race to the
normative bottom. In other words, one can seek to avoid conflict escalation without unilaterally
disarming.244 One can no doubt question the usefulness of that distinction, given that what one
side views as “tit for tat” the other side may be likely to interpret as conflict escalation. Even so,
the distinction is defensible in principle and is applied in practice in a variety of settings.
Consider, for example, the distinction in foreign policy circles between economic sanctions and
military intervention. Moreover, there may be a difference between how politicians characterize
the other side’s behavior in public and what they understand to be going on in private.
Finally, is also worth reflecting on whether there are ways of moving beyond “tit for tat”
interactions and promoting a race to the top. Doing so would likely require incremental,
confidence-building measures and compromises over extended periods of time. For example, if
the Democrats had gained control of the Senate in the 2016 elections, they might have done more
than simply refuse to confirm any Supreme Court nominee not named Merrick Garland (or
someone ideologically similar). They might have also agreed to consider in good faith future
Trump nominees once Garland was confirmed.
Notwithstanding concerns about implementation, this Article’s proposal is worth taking
seriously because it invites legal scholars to recast their thinking on a fundamental level—and
arguments on that level find their purchase on one’s overall view of the world more than in their
short or even medium-term impact on specific decisions. There is a huge difference between a
constitutional regime in which there are norms and conventions based on role that are often
violated by elected officials, and a regime in which those norms and conventions are simply not
thought to exist. This Article is arguing for a reconfiguration of America’s world of political
decisions. At some point, there is no escaping attention to how the vision could become reality.
But in a deeply polarized country in which politicians who hold high office too often act as if
there are no non-legal role restraints, the immediate task is to develop the vision itself.
Moreover, it is easy to miss the extent to which norms that constrain the worst forms of
partisanship continue to operate in the present.245 As bad as the current situation is from the
vantage point of the vision articulated in this Article, the truth is that it could be much worse. For
example, the Justices are not simply partisans; all (or almost all) of them disappoint the political
party that appointed them at least some of the time. There are no serious proposals in the political
branches calling for Court-packing or the impeachment of Justices or judges appointed by
presidents of the other party. There has not been a wholesale politicization of federal criminal
law enforcement, even as the longstanding convention of independence from the president
appears to be under pressure. 246 There is no widespread practice of Republican-appointed
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secretaries of state refusing to certify elections that Democrats won based on highly dubious
allegations of widespread voter fraud.247 There are, of course, examples that potentially count as
exceptions to most of the above generalizations, but they do not disprove the rule.248 Nor do the
generalizations seem entirely explainable in terms of political self-interest. Anyone who thinks
that normatively unrestrained partisanship could not get substantially more severe in American
politics lacks imagination, knowledge of comparative politics, or awareness of American
history.249
In addition, it is possible to conceive of circumstances that could make this Article’s
normative account more realistic in the foreseeable future. For example, given his consistently
low poll numbers notwithstanding an increasingly strong economy,250 it is at least plausible to
imagine that President Trump’s reputation as the ultimate norm violator will contribute to his
defeat in the 2020 Republican presidential primary or the general election. His prominence in the
anticanon of exemplars of constitutional role morality may ultimately prompt more candidates
for public office—Republicans and Democrats alike—to develop and deserve reputations for
civility and civic virtue.251 The causes of polarization would not have changed, but the vision
offered here would still seem more realistic than it may now.
At the very least, one can imagine a fruitful agenda for the American Bar Association, the
American Constitution Society, the Federalist Society, and patriotic, thoughtful liberals and
conservatives in the legal profession. Operating behind a veil of ignorance about who would
showboat-fbi.html (“[F]or the first time, he explicitly referenced the F.B.I.’s investigation into his administration’s
ties to Russia in defending Mr. Comey’s firing.”); Betsy Klein, Trump Slams Sessions, Rips DOJ in Twitter
Outburst, CNN (July 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/25/politics/donald-trump-jeff-sessions-hillaryclinton/index.html (“President Donald Trump lashed out at his attorney general and Justice Department in an
extraordinary outburst on Twitter Tuesday morning, continuing his public shaming of Jeff Sessions while appearing
to prod the nation’s top law enforcement official to investigate Hillary Clinton, his 2016 election opponent.”).
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The first political transition—from the hitherto dominant Federalists to the ascendant Democratic
Republicans—was so rocky in part because the Founders lacked many of the norms and conventions that manage
political transitions today. And so when one side created judgeships at the last minute, the other side terminated
them in likely contravention of Article III and canceled a Supreme Court term to postpone judicial resolution of the
matter. For discussion of the crisis of 1800-1803, see generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING
FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2007).
250

See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, Donald Trump Is in a Very Bad Polling Place, CNN (Nov. 4, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/03/politics/trump-polling/index.html (“Of the 10 major national polls conducted over
the past month, the highest – repeat: the highest – Trump’s approval rating has been is 38%. The lowest is 33%.
Trump’s average approval rating over those 10 polls is 37.1%. His average disapproval? 57.1%.”).
251

Cf., e.g., Greene, supra note 54 (discussing why certain judicial decisions have come to be regarded as
“anticanonical”).

54

control the federal government at a certain future date, those organizations and individuals could
work together to agree upon certain norms of conduct by elected officials in particular settings
(for example, judicial nominations and confirmations), and to encourage reciprocity in adhering
to those norms. The American Constitution Society is already interested in the topic of norms
and conventions, as are some conservatives.252 Such a project would face a variety of obstacles
in terms of both obtaining sufficient “buy in” and producing agreement on standards that are not
so vague as to be meaningless. But doing nothing seems like a clearly inferior alternative. As for
the criticism that the project is profoundly antidemocratic—that it is “the Establishment”
imposing constraints on democracy—several points developed in this Article bear repeating:
most Americans are not nearly as partisan as their representatives and the political class; role
restraints are conducive to minority self-governance (and all Americans can expect to be on the
losing end of elections in the years ahead); most Americans want the federal government to
function reasonably well; and, in any event, successful democracies also require leadership.

CONCLUSION
Presidents and members of Congress are not federal judges, but nor are they as
categorically distinct as most constitutional law scholars have tended to suppose. Such scholars
expect judges to be restrained by a constitutional role morality that imposes obligations over and
above legal obligations. It is time to expect the same of elected officials.
This Article has been primarily concerned with justifying and inspiring efforts to
articulate a constitutional role morality for elected officials of the federal government, not with
completing this task on its own. It has grounded constitutional role morality in two purposes of
the Constitution that law cannot fully accomplish on its own: the American conception of
democracy as collective self-governance, and the perceived desirability, both historically and
today, of a reasonably effective federal government. It has suggested for consideration some
rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of such a role morality. The Article has not
focused on how to make its normative vision a reality, but it has suggested that, over the longer
term, newer forms of civic education and law teaching may make some difference. More
immediately and practically, demanding role restraints of elected officials can help license robust
practices of political resistance to aggressive ideological agendas that politicians may seek to
justify by invoking their victories on Election Day.
Constitutional law scholars, along with scholars of legislation and the legal profession,
can further develop the rhetorical, procedural, and substantive components of the role morality
sketched here. Alternatively, they can explain why those suggestions ought to be rejected and a
different set of role expectations adopted. It is difficult to know what potentially attractive role
morality will be developed if legal scholars do not even try. What constitutional law scholars
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should not do is continue writing and teaching as if, as far as the U.S. Constitution is concerned,
politicians are free to do whatever they want within the bounds of the law.
Skeptics will no doubt ask—as they should—what incentives elected officials have to
moderate their behavior beyond the demands of legality. They may also ask (rhetorically, this
time) what, in the absence of such incentives, some “cackling” or, worse, preaching by law
professors will ever accomplish.253 This Article may perhaps be described as cackling, but it is
not a homily. It is, rather, an invitation to look at American political and constitutional
arrangements from a different perspective than the usual one. The hope is that some
constitutional law scholars and other legal academics will accept the invitation, and that some of
them will then expand their beliefs about what is preferable—and even possible—in American
politics.
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